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Nuclear
Control Institute Committee
to Bridge the Gap Preventing Nuclear
Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention
of Nuclear Terrorism, Paul Leventhal and
Yonah Alexander, editors. Lexington Books. 1987. (See Report and technical
papers, below.) February 2, 1987: Letter from NCI President Paul
Leventhal to the Commission, urging upgrade of security against radiological
sabotage at nuclear power plants March 13, 1987: Letter from NRC Chairman Lando W.
Zech, concerning NRC activities to provide assurance that nuclear power plants
are adequately protected. October 17, 1987:
Letter from NCI President Paul Leventhal and NCI Scientific Director
Milton Hoenig to Frank Carlucci, Assistant to the President, concerning the
Iranian threat against U.S. nuclear reactors and need for protection against
vehicle bombs. November 9, 1987:
Response from Carlucci stating that NCI's "thoughtful
analysis" will be fully considered in ongoing review of security at
government and commercial plants.. October 19, 1987: Letter to NRC chairman Lando Zech,
Jr. concerning Iranian threat to U.S.
nuclear reactors and need for protection against vehicle bombs. December 7, 1987 response from Acting NRC chairman
Frederick Bernthal February 5, 1988: Letter to J. Bennett Johnston
concerning vulnerability of domestic nuclear power reactors to vehicle-bomb
attack. May 25, 1995: Letter from NCI President Paul Leventhal
and Committee to Bridge the Gap President Daniel Hirsch to NRC Chairman Ivan
Selin concerning Oklahoma City bombing and implications for protecting nuclear
power plants. November 6, 1995: Letter from NCI President Paul
Leventhal and Committee to Bridge the Gap President Daniel Hirsch to NRC
Chairman Shirley Jackson concerning need to upgrade rule on protection of
nuclear power plants against truck bombs. http://www.nci.org/l/l11695.htm December 20, 1995: Reply from NRC Chair Shirley
Jackson, stating that NRC staff has been in close contact with agencies
involved in investigating the Oklahoma City bombing and that the NRC is
confident that the design basis threat is adequate. http://www.nci.org/l/l122095a.htm August 25, 1998: Letter from NCI President Paul
Leventhal and Committee to Bridge the Gap President Daniel Hirsch to NRC
Chairman Shirley Jackson concerning adequacy of protection of nuclear power
plants against truck bombs, following bombings of American targets in Kenya and
Tanzania and U.S. retaliation in Sudan and Afghanistan. The letter calls for placing plants on
maximum security and upgrading long-term security measures. December 21, 1998: Response from NRC Executive
Director for Operations William D. Travers, transmitting briefing document,
Concerns About Protection Against Truck Bombs and NRCs Responses." December 23, 1999: Letter from NCI President Paul
Leventhal and Committee to Bridge the Gap President Daniel Hirsch to NRC
Chairman Richard Meserve regarding inadequate protection of nuclear power
reactors against millenial terrorist attack.
http://www.nci.org/c/c122399.htm December 30, 1999:
Response from NRC Chairman Richard Meserve pointing out that the NRC requires a high level of security at
all times and continuously evaluates threat information. August 23, 2000: Comments by Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI
Scientific Director, on the NRC's "Re-Evaluation of Power Reactor Physical
Protection Regulations and Position on a Definition of Radiological
Sabotage," as outlined in SECY-00-0063.
http://www.nci.org/e/el-nrc82300.htm December 21, 2000: Letter from
NCI Scientific Director Edwin Lyman and NCI President Paul Leventhal to NRC Chairman Richard
Meserve recommending that enforcement actions pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(a) be
required by the Commission if serious deficiencies in nuclear power plant
physical protection systems are revealed during force-on-force exercises
conducted under the current Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE)
program. http://www.nci.org/n/nrc122100.htm February 8, 2001: Response from NRC Chairman Richard
Meserve, reporting that the NRC will not send notice of violations to licensees
that fail the OSRE security tests. July 11, 2001: Letter from NCI
Scientific Director Edwin Lyman and NCI President Paul Leventhal to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve regarding Commission's decision to
exempt plants which volunteer to participate in the Safeguards Performance Assessment
(SPA) pilot program from previously scheduled or anticipated Operational
Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) exercises, without regard to whether
those plants have exhibited serious security weaknesses in recent site
inspections. http://www.nci.org/01nci/07/10-weak_nrc_plan.htm September 14, 2001:
Letter from NCI President Paul Leventhal and NCI Research Director
Steven Dolley to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve proposing urgent security
measures for nuclear power plants following
the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. September 21, 2001: Response from NRC Chairman Richard
Meserve, stating the Commission is evaluating current requirements and
statutory authority "including but not limited to the those that you
presented in your letter." September 17, 2001: Letter from NCI President Paul
Leventhal and NCI Research Director Steven Dolley to Prime Minister Tony Blair,
recommending that the Sellafield plutonium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel Plant not be commissioned for operation in light
of September 11 terrorist attacks. March 9, 1988:
Petition for Rulemaking submitted by the Committee to Bridge the Gap,
asking the NRC to amend its regulations in order to update the design basis
threat for radiological sabotage. January 11, 1991:
Petition for Rulemaking submitted by the Nuclear Control Institute and
the Committee to Bridge the Gap, asking the NRC to upgrade the design basis
threat for radiological sabotage.
Petitioners seek a revision of the threat assessment to include
explosives-laden surface vehicles and a larger number of attackers using more
sophisticated weapons than presently contemplated. Petitioners ask that the request be given urgent attention. January 23, 1991:
Response from Donnie H. Grimsley, NRC Office of Administration,
reporting that the comment period will be shortened from 60 days to 30 days to
comply with this request. March 14, 1991:
Letter to NRC from Eldon Greenberg, NCI counsel, rebutting contentions
by nuclear industry trade organization that advance identification of potential
threats is assured. June 5, 1991:
Petition for rulemaking is denied.
NRC stated there has been no change in the domestic threat that would
justify a change to the design basis threat.
Despite a reduction in U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict,
the NRC pledged to maintain its vigilance. September 4, 1991:
Request for Action from NCI and Committee to Bridge the Gap to institute
individual plant examination program to evaluate the margin of nuclear power
reactors to withstand safeguards events beyond the current design basis. December 31, 1991:
Petition denied. The NRC pointed
out that its regulations do not require licensees to design safety systems to
be resistant to various acts of sabotage . . . Instead it requires licensees to
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system . designed to
protect against the design basis threat.
However, as a matter of prudence, the NRC requested licensees to
prepare contingency measures in the event that the threat environment changes. March 9, 1988: House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations. Testimony by NCI
President Paul Leventhal and by Committee to Bridge the Gap President Daniel
Hirsch on the threat of sabotage and terrorism to commercial nuclear reactors
in the United States. March 19, 1993: Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear
Regulation. Testimony by attorney Eldon
Greenberg for Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap,
challenging the adequacy of nuclear power plant security to protect against
terrorism and sabotage. May 10, 1993: Considerations Related to Reassessment of the Design Basis
Threat for Radiological Sabotage, by Steven Sholly, Senior Consultant, MHB
Technical Associates, presented on behalf of Committee to Bridge the Gap and
Nuclear Control Institute, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Public Meeting
on the Design Basis Threat, Rockville, Maryland. May 5, 1999: Testimony by NCI President Paul Leventhal
before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the Recommendations of the NRC
Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force.
http://www.nci.org/t/t5599.htm Daniel
Hirsch, Stephanie Murphy and Bennett Ramberg, "Nuclear Terrorism: A
Growing Threat," a report to the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, May 7, 1985: Adlai E. Stevenson Program on Nuclear Policy,
University of California at Santa Cruz; Center for International and Strategic
Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles. "Report
of International Task Force on
Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism." Nuclear Control Institute and the
Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York,
June 25, 1986. Albright,
David, "Civilian Inventories of Plutonium and Highly Enriched
Uranium." Beres,
Louis Rene, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Responses to Terrorist
Grievances." Bunn,
George, "International Arrangements against Nuclear Terrorism." Despres,
John, "Intelligence and the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism." DeVito,
Donald A. and Lacy Suiter, "Emergency Management and the Nuclear Terrorism
Threat." Dixon,
Herbert, "Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities." Gates,
Mahlon E., "The Nuclear Emergency Search Team." Goldberg,
Steven, "Civil Liberties and Nuclear Terrorism." Greenberg,
Eldon V.C. and Milton M. Hoenig, "The Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle:
Options to Reduce the Risk of Terrorism and Proliferation." Hirsch,
Daniel, "The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to Nuclear Facilities." http://www.nci.org/g-h/hirschtb.htm Jacchia,
Enrico, "European Nuclear Safeguards and terrorism: A Personal
Perspective." Julian,
Thomas A., "Nuclear Weapons Security and Control." Kellen,
Konrad, "The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism: A Discussion." Mark,
J. Carson and Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob
Wechsler, "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?" http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm Mastrangelo,
Eugene, "Terrorist Activities by Region." Moglewer,
Sidney, "International Safeguards and Nuclear Terrorism." Mullen,
Robert K., "Nuclear Violence." Neeman,
Yuval, "Mobilizing Intelligence against Nuclear Terrorism: A Personal
Perspective." Nunn,
Sam and John W. Warner, "U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Countering Nuclear
Terrorism: The Role of Risk Reduction Centers. Pollack,
Gerald A., "Severe Accidents and Terrorist Threats at Nuclear
Reactors." Post,
Jerrold M., "Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations
and Constraints." Rossnagel,
Alexander, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials in the
Federal Republic of Germany." Spector,
Leonard S., "Clandestine Nuclear Trade and the Threat of Nuclear
Terrorism." Sterling,
Claire. "Responses to Terrorist Grievances: Another Perspective." Wolfe, Bertram and Burton F. Judson, "The Back
End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An Update." "The
Insider Threat to NRC-Licensed Facilities," by Matthew Levy, September
1986. "Outside
Threats to NRC-Licensed Facilities," by Matthew Levy. September 1986. "Nuclear
Fuel Cycle, Terrorism and National Security," Milton M. Hoenig, April
1987. "Bunkered
and Tamper-Proof Reactor Systems," Milton M. Hoenig, April 1987. "Locking
Nuclear Weapons," Milton M. Hoenig, April 1987. "Guarding
Nuclear Weapons," Milton M. Hoenig, April 1987. "Tampering
in Nuclear Power Plant Control Rooms: Human Factors Issues," by Dr. John
W. Senders, May 1988. "Transportation of Plutonium into and
within Japan," by Alan Kuperman, April 1989. Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium
Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?, by Marvin Miller, August 1990. http://www.nci.org/k-m/mmsgrds.htm Evaluating the Margin of Nuclear Power
Reactors to withstand safeguards events beyond the current design basis, May
17, 1991. Safeguards Shortcomings: A Critique, by
Paul Leventhal, NCI President, September 12, 1994. http://www.nci.org/p/plsgrds.htm Highly-Enriched
Uranium Seized in Czech Republic Reveals a Growing Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,
Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, and Paul Leventhal, NCI President,
December 22, 1994. http://www.nci.org/g-h/heuib1.htm A Critique of Physical Protection
Standards for Transport of Irradiated Materials, Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI
Scientific Director, Presented at the 40th
Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, AZ,
July 1999. http://www.nci.org/e/el-inmm99.htm Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants: A
Moving Target Set, by Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director and Paul
Leventhal, NCI President, Presented to the 43rd Annual Meeting of
the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, July 2000. http://www.nci.org/e/el-inmm2000.htm The Threat of Radiological Sabotage: A Potential
Show-Stopper, by Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, Excerpt from an
Address to NCI Conference, Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons:
Can We Have One Without the Other?, April 9, 2001. http://www.nci.org/e/el4901.htm Full paper: Can the Proliferation
Risks of Nuclear Power Be Made Acceptable? http://www.nci.org/conf/lyman/index.htm "Nuclear
Installations and Potential Risks. The Hidden Danger: Risks of Nuclear
Terrorism," by Paul Leventhal and Milton Hoenig. Terrorism, vol. 10, 1987.
Presented at the Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe. Paris. January
1987. "Possible
Approaches by NATO to Recommendations of International Task Force on Prevention
of Nuclear Terrorism," by Thomas Julian, April 1987. "International
Aspects of Nuclear Terrorism: Some Options for Intergovernmental Action,"
by Ben Sanders, May 1987. "Nuclear
Terrorism: Issues for Legislative Remedy," September 1987. "The
Hidden Danger: Risks of Nuclear Terrorism," by Paul Leventhal. Presented
at the Amici della Terra International Conference on Nuclear Power and War,
Rome. October 1987. "International
Nuclear Terrorism: Implications for Latin America," by Dr. John Redick,
presented before the Argentine Council for International Relations, Buenos
Aires, May 1988. "Nuclear
Terrorism: A Latin American Perspective," by Ambassador Julio Cesar
Carasales, presented before the Argentine Council for International Relations,
Buenos Aires, May 1988. "Plutonium,
Terrorism and the Federal Republic of Germany." Testimony of Paul
Leventhal before the 2nd Committee of Investigation of the German Bundestag,
Bonn, June 23, 1988. "Nuclear
Deterrence and Nuclear Terrorism: Implications for Israel," by Paul
Leventhal, presented to the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and to the Tel Aviv
University Conference on Terrorism, August 1988. "Nuclear
No Man's Land." Testimony by Paul Leventhal before the 2nd Committee of
Investigation of the German Bundestag, Bonn, September 22, 1988. "Nuclear
Terrorism: Threat, Perception, and Response in South Asia," by Paul
Leventhal and Brahma Chellaney, Terrorism, Volume 11, 1988. Presented to the
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, October, 1988. http://www.nci.org/p/pl-bc.htm "Nuclear
Terrorism: Reactor Sabotage and Weapons Proliferation Risks," by Paul
Leventhal and Milton Hoenig, Contemporary Policy Issues, July 1990. A paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Western Economic Association
International, Lake Tahoe, Nevada, June 22, 1989. Nuclear
Plants Military Hostages?" by Bennett Ramberg, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
March 1986. "Protecting
Reactors from Terrorists" by Daniel Hirsch, Stephanie Murphy and Bennett
Ramberg, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, March 1986. "Report
on Nuclear Terrorism," Excerpts from report of International Task Force on
Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
December 1986, pp. 38-44. "The
Hidden Danger: Risks of Nuclear Terrorism," by Paul Leventhal and Milton
Hoenig. Terrorism,
Volume 10, pp. 1-22. 1987. Crane, Russak & Company. "Spectre
of nuclear blackmail," by Paul Leventhal and Brahma Chellaney, The
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 13, 1989. "The
Nuclear Power/Nuclear Weapons Connection," by Paul Leventhal, Social
Education, March, 1990. "SDI
is No Answer to Nuclear Terrorism," by Deborah Holland and Daniel Horner, The
Washington Post, March 28, 1990, op-ed page. "Prospects
for Diversion of Plutonium from Japanese Facilities," by Helen M. Hunt,
April 1990. Published in Proceedings of the Institute for Nuclear Materials
Management, Summer 1990. "Plutonium
Terror on the High Seas?, by Admirals Thomas Davies and Stansfield Turner, The New York
Times, April 28, 1990, Op-ed page; reprinted in the Asahi
Shimbun, June 15, 1990. More
Nuclear Power Means More Risk, by Paul Leventhal, NCI President, New York
Times, May 17, 2001, op-ed page. http://www.nci.org/new/oped.htm Davies,
Rear Admiral Thomas D., USN (Ret.), "What Nuclear Means and Targets Might
Terrorists Find Attractive?" Denton,
Senator Jeremiah, "International Terrorism: the Nuclear Dimension." Gephardt,
Representative Richard, "The New Nightmare: Nuclear Terrorism." Giuffrida,
Louis 0., "How Can Government and Industry Effectively Respond to Threats
of Nuclear Terrorism." Jenkins,
Brian M., "Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?" O'Keefe,
Bernard, "How Can Nuclear Violence Be Prevented?" The following anti-terrorism legislation was
attributable to studies and proposals by the Nuclear Control Institute: Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399) required
interagency determination of the terrorist threat prior to shipments of
U.S.-origin fissile materials to nuclear programs abroad. Five Federal agencies
were also required to prepare independent reports on the adequacy of physical
protection of plutonium and highly enriched uranium during transport and
storage in civil programs outside the United States. November 3, 1998: U.S. Drops
Anti-Terrorist Tests at Nuclear Plants, by Frank Clifford, Los Angeles
Times. http://www.nci.org/a/a11398.htm November 3, 1998: Anti-Terror Program for Nuclear
Plants Axed, USA Today. http://www.nci.org/a/a11398a.htm November 11, 1998: U.S. Lawmaker Fears Risk of
Nuclear Plant Attacks, by Patrick Connole, Reuters Wire Service. http://www.nci.org/a/a111198.htm September 14, 2001:
Power Points: Airplane Attack
Exposes Nuclear Plant Myth by Mark Golden, Dow Jones Newswires http://www.nci.org/01/09/14-16.htm September 17, 2001:
A Nuclear Nightmare by Douglas Pasternak U.S. News & World Report http://www.nci.org/01/09/09-3.htm August 7, 1998: Memorandum to Samuel J. Collins,
Director, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, from David N. Orrik, Capt
USN (Ret), Security Specialist Subject:
Differing Professional View Regarding NRC Abandoning Its Only Counter- Terrorism Program. May 5, 1999: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Transcript of Public Meeting, Briefing on Safeguards Performance
Assessment. Includes Testimony by Paul
Leventhal, NCI President, and Eldon V.C. Greenberg, NCI Counsel. http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/COMMISSION/TRANSCRIPTS/19990505a.html July 5, 2001:
Memorandum from William Travers, Executive Director for Operations,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regarding Staff Requirements SECY-01-0060
The Safeguards Performance Assessment Pilot Program. http://www.nci.org/new/nrc7501.htm August 1, 1994: Experts Praise NRC Truck-Bomb Rule But
Decry Delays and Shortcomings. Press
Release, NCI & Committee to Bridge the Gap. http://www.nci.org/pr/pr8194.htm December 23, 1999: Watchdog Groups Reveal NRCs
Misguided Millenial Message to Reactor Operators: Dont Upgrade Defenses
Against Terrorists. Press Release, NCI & Committee to Bridge the
Gap. http://www.nci.org/pr/pr122399.htm July 11, 2001: NCI Objects to
Weak NRC Plan for Testing Power Plant Defenses Against Terrorists. Press Statement Accompanying Release of
Letter from NCI Scientific Director Edwin Lyman and NCI President Paul Leventhal
Hirsch to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve regarding
Commission's decision to exempt plants which volunteer to participate in the
Safeguards Performance Assessment (SPA) pilot program from previously scheduled
or anticipated Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) exercises,
without regard to whether those plants have exhibited serious security
weaknesses in recent site inspections. http://www.nci.org/01nci/07/10-weak_nrc_plan.htm |
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