October 29, 2001
The Honorable Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Berlin
Federal
Republic of Germany
Risk of Terrorism
at Bavarias FRM-II Reactor
Dear Chancellor Schroeder,
We are writing in the
wake of the heightened, worldwide terrorist alert triggered by the attacks of
September 11, 2001 to urge you to
reconsider your governments acquiescence in the proposed start-up of
Bavarias FRM-II
research reactor using bomb-grade uranium fuel.
The proposed bomb-grade,
highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel would be in use and storage at a civilian
university that cannot be guarded like a military facility. It is highly imprudent to present such an
extremely tempting target to Osama Bin Laden and other terrorists of his ilk,
who have repeatedly sought to obtain this material in Europe, according to
numerous authoritative reports. In light
of the current terrorist threat and the feasibility of still converting the
FRM-II prior to its start-up to available low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel that
is unsuitable for weapons we urge you to deny the third operating license
(3.TEG) for the FRM-II on compelling national security grounds. We also ask you to announce that your
government will not issue a license to operate the FRM-II until the reactor is
converted to LEU fuel.
The threat posed by
HEU in the hands of terrorists should be clear.
Less than 25 kilograms is sufficient to construct an implosion-type
atomic bomb. Twice that amount would be
sufficient for a far simpler gun-type atomic bomb like that used to destroy
Hiroshima. The relative ease of making a bomb with HEU
was underscored by the late Luis Alvarez, a participant in the Manhattan
Project, in his memoirs:
With modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so
low that terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of
setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material
onto the other half. Most people seem unaware
that if separate HEU is at hand it's a trivial job to set off a nuclear
explosion . . . even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order.
According to the 25 October
2001 joint declaration by Bavarias science minister, Hans Zehetmair, and the
federal parliamentary undersecretary of state, Wolf-Michael Catenhusen, the
FRM-II is to be started with HEU fuel of 93%-enrichment, which is even more
highly enriched than the 80 to 85%-enriched fuel used in the Hiroshima atomic
bomb. Moreover, the reactor is currently slated to
use 40 kilograms per year of HEU through 2010, meaning that as much as 360
kilograms of bomb-grade uranium would pass through the Bavarian facility. At a minimum, this amount is sufficient for
14 nuclear weapons. However, recent
studies report that considerably less HEU is required for implosion-type
nuclear weapons,
indicating that the FRM-II would use dozens of bombs worth of HEU through 2010
and that the site would at all times contain sufficient HEU for at least one
nuclear weapon.
Further highlighting the terrorist
threat, a study prepared for the Nuclear Control Institute by five former
nuclear-weapons designers from Los Alamos National Laboratory concluded that
any group sophisticated enough to obtain HEU or plutonium could put together a
technical team capable of producing implosion as well as gun-type nuclear
weapons.
The tragic events of
September 11 demonstrate that terrorists are now prepared to engage in mass
destruction and mass killing and are capable of conducting sophisticated,
well-coordinated operations in large numbers.
The question you should ask, Mr. Chancellor, is whether the FRM-II at
Garching can be defended against 19 well-armed, suicidal terrorists attacking
from four different directions. That is
the new threat made manifest by the terrorist attacks of September 11. If such a defense is possible, who is to pay
for it and take responsibility for ensuring that it is maintained for decades
to come at peak efficiency? It should be
clear that the FRM-II was not designed to defend against such a large and
sophisticated threat. Nor is it feasible
or appropriate for a civilian university to be prepared to defend against such
a threat.
The proposal in the
Zehetmair/Catenhusen declaration, to start the FRM-II with 93%-enriched HEU
fuel and then convert it after 2010 to 50%-enriched uranium fuel, is both too
little and too late. It is too late
because Germany and the rest of
the civilized world cannot afford to risk another 10 years of unnecessary
commerce in weapons-grade uranium, knowing that Bin Laden and his confederates
are on the prowl for such uranium. It is
too little because reduction to 50% enrichment is insufficient to eliminate the
terrorist threat. Such material is still
formally designated HEU by the International Atomic Energy Agency because
uranium of this enrichment remains suitable for direct use in a nuclear weapon.
The only way to ensure against the terrorist threat is to convert the FRM II to
LEU, meaning to uranium that is below 20%-enrichment and thus unsuitable for
direct use in weapons.
Fortunately, it is still
feasible to convert the FRM-II to LEU prior to start-up, as documented in
studies by both the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory and Germanys
Darmstadt
University. The operators of the FRM-II have resisted
such conversion because the required increase in the size of the fuel element
and reactor core would cause some additional delay and expense. While such dubious arguments against
conversion might have been tolerable prior to September 11, the new, undeniable
terrorist threat now demands that security take prevalence over convenience.
To allay one other potential
concern, we wish to underscore that conversion to LEU will not inhibit the
quality or competitiveness of German scientific research. Both the Argonne and
Darmstadt studies make
clear that the FRM-II will be able to carry out the same experiments with LEU
fuel as with HEU fuel. All high-power
research reactors built in the West since 1978 use LEU fuel, so the FRM-II
would be competing on a level playing field.
Several decades ago, research reactors were built with HEU, before the
proliferation and terrorism potential of this fuel were fully appreciated. But the vast majority of these reactors that
require refuelings with fresh HEU fuel have since been converted to LEU.
Only four operating reactors
continue to use HEU in Europe, of which one (in the Netherlands) is in the
process of converting to LEU, two others (in France and Belgium) have pledged
to convert to LEU as soon as feasible, and the last (in France) will probably
shut down before it can be converted.
Moreover, in 1995, the United States canceled a
proposed HEU-fueled reactor, the Advanced Neutron Source, on grounds that the
bomb-grade fuel presented "a non-proliferation policy concern." In addition, new state-of-the-art research
reactors under construction by France and China are both
designed to use LEU fuel. In short, the
worlds best neutron research will be done in the years ahead with LEU fuel not
HEU fuel. For Germany now to start up
an HEU-fueled FRM-II would be an embarrassing and extremely dangerous
anachronism.
Mr. Chancellor, the world
changed on September 11. History will
judge us by how quickly we recognize and react to this fundamental change. We ask you to put security before political
exigency by halting the proposed use of bomb-grade uranium in Bavaria and ordering
that the FRM-II reactor must be converted to non-weapons-usable LEU fuel before
the federal government will issue a final operating license.
Thank you for your
consideration of this international security matter of the highest urgency.
Sincerely,
Alan J. Kuperman Paul L.
Leventhal
Senior Policy
Analyst President