March 4, 2002
General John Gordon
Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Agency
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, DC 20585
Substantial Changes to Plutonium Disposition Mandate Supplemental EIS
Dear General Gordon:
On February 8,
the
The additional
substantial changes to the plutonium disposition program, which trigger need
for an SEIS, are twofold:
1) the decision to build a new waste
solidification facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to support the mixed
uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) mission, and
2) the decision to add at least two additional,
unnamed reactors for MOX use.
Under DOEs
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations, these changes each
constitute a substantial change from the DOEs Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0283)(Nov.1999) (SPDEIS) and
the subsequent Record of Decision (ROD), dated January 11, 2000. DOE regulations require DOE to prepare a
supplemental EIS if there are substantial changes to the proposal or
significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental
concerns 10 C.F.R. 1021.314(a).
New Waste Solidification Facility at the Savannah River
Site
On February 13,
at a meeting between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Duke
Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS), the contractor carrying out the MOX program
for DOE, NCI learned that DOE is now planning to build a new waste
solidification facility at SRS to handle the liquid radioactive waste streams
coming from the NRC-licensed MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The DCS handouts at that meeting state that
program changes include solidification of waste in lieu of processing
through SRS waste tanks and that waste processing of high-a and uranium waste streams from the MOX facility would now be
handled via processing & solidification at SRS facility off the MFFF
site. This new facility thus would not
be licensed by the NRC but its operation would rely on waste storage tanks
located in the MFFF plant which would provide the feed for solidification. Apparently, the cost of this facility is
included in the $3.8 billion cost announced for the MOX-only program, but no
cost estimate for the facility has been publicly presented nor has it been
subject to any NEPA review.
DOE stated in
the SPDEIS that liquid transuranic (TRU) wastes generated during operation of
the pit conversion and MOX facilities at SRS would be evaporated or
solidified before being packaged for storage, that such wastes would be
certified to WIPP waste acceptance criteria, and that loading the TRUPACT
for shipment to WIPP would occur at the planned TRU Waste Characterization and
Certification Facility at SRS. (H.4.2.3.2, pp. H-58) However, the SPDEIS fails to describe any
further details about that TRU waste solidification facility.
Given that a
much larger amount of impure plutonium is now intended for processing into
MOX---plutonium which DOE has always maintained could not be processed for MOX
use---it is critical that DOE fully analyze under NEPA both the plutonium
purification process and associated equipment needed, as well as how the
resulting waste streams will be managed.
The new waste solidification facility, required to support operation of
the MFFF plant, in and of itself constitutes a substantial change to the
program and thus mandates preparation of an SEIS.
DOE Seeks Two More MOX Reactors
With the issuance of DOEs February 15 Report to Congress: Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site, it is now known how DOE hopes to accelerate the rate of plutonium disposition. According to the report, which proposes increasing the rate of disposition via MOX from 2 metric tons (MT) to 3.5 MT per year, successful implementation requires obtaining two additional commercial reactors to participate in the program and expanding the rate of plutonium disposition in Russia. However, the report does not provide any details about how DOE plans to accomplish these objectives and meet the aggressive schedule put forward in the report.
In fact, DOE may need even more than two reactors to carry out the new disposition rate. At the currently planned maximum core loading of 40% MOX --- a maximum rooted in technical limits of operating light-water reactors --- a large pressurized-water reactor (1150 MWe) operating on a standard 1.5-year refueling cycle can accommodate at most 0.5 MT of plutonium per year. Under the old plutonium disposition strategy, which relied on the four reactors currently in the program (Duke Powers Catawba and McGuire ice-condenser plants), only 2 MT per year could have been absorbed. Thus a minimum of three new reactors --- and probably four --- would likely be needed to accommodate the additional 1.5 MT of plutonium per year without exceeding the current maximum core loading.
Before Dominion Resources removed its North Anna 1&2 reactors from the plutonium disposition program in April 2000, the maximum estimated throughput for all six reactors was about 2.9 MT per year, and it was estimated that 13 years would have been required to irradiate 34 MT, beginning in 2007 and ending in 2020. Under the new program, batch delivery of fuel to reactors is scheduled to begin in Fall 2008, and the program is slated for completion in 2019 (11 years duration). Thus, it would appear that at least seven reactors --- three more than the number currently under contract --- would be required to dispose of 34 MT over the shorter time period. More realistically, the start of the program may be further delayed as a result of the changes to the MOX fabrication plant design that are necessary to purify the plutonium feedstock that was originally slated for immobilization; thus, completion by 2019 would likely require yet another reactor.
The details of how DOE intends to locate
three or even two additional reactors for the MOX program without causing any
delays to the existing schedule --- and reducing the overall cost of MOX
irradiation by several hundred million dollars to boot --- were not discussed
in the Report to Congress. As mentioned above, the North Anna
plant in Virginia was originally part of the plutonium disposition program, but
its owner, Dominion Resources, dropped out in April 2000, in what was described
as a business decision. Part of the reason for this was the fact that
North Anna would have required additional control rods or modification of the
existing control rods to accommodate a 40% MOX loading, which would have been
costly. It is highly unlikely that Dominion could be persuaded to
participate again in the controversial MOX program without significant economic
incentives.
A Supplement to
the Draft SPDEIS (April 1999) included site-specific analyses of the McGuire,
Catawba and North Anna reactors, and this information was incorporated into the
Final SPDEIS. Given that Dominion is
unlikely to offer its reactors for the MOX program, DOE must fully explain in
an SEIS which reactors are now being considered for MOX use and fully analyze in
this SEIS the site-specific environmental impacts of MOX use in those reactors,
including severe accident scenarios. A
generic reactor assessment of MOX use, as discussed in the DOEs Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0229)(Dec. 1996), is insufficient
to meet NEPA requirements. Further, DOE
itself established the precedent that a
Supplement is needed in order to assess reactor information of a site-specific
nature.
Request for Supplement Analysis and Associated
Determination
We understand
that DOE may be preparing a Supplement Analysis to aid in determining which
steps to take under NEPA, given the changes to the plutonium disposition
program. According to DOE regulations
[10 C.F.R. 1021.314(c)(3)], DOE shall make the determination and related
Supplement Analysis available to the public for informationupon written
request. Thus, I am requesting copies
of any supplement analysis or analyses and associated determinations prepared
due to changes in any aspect of the plutonium disposition program.
Status of Two Metric Tons of Plutonium Remains Uncertain
Since the
announcement on January 23 that 2 MT of very impure plutonium were going to
be sent directly to waste, DOE has failed to clarify the disposition route
for this material. It is believed that
DOE had planned to downblend the material and send it directly to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico.
Expressing his opposition to this idea, Senator Pete Domenici wrote to
Secretary Abraham on February 5, stating that dilution of weapons materials,
simply in order to facilitate disposal, raises serious questions about our
adherence to the same international controls on weapon-related materials that
we expect other nations to follow. All
disposal options in addition to WIPP, such as direct immobilization in
vitrified material at the Defense Waste Processing Facility at SRS, must be
fully analyzed in the SEIS.
Record of Decision Must Not be Revised Prior to Issuance
of a Final SEIS
Given that a
number of substantial changes have been made to the plutonium disposition
program, it is clear than an SEIS must be prepared. Simply amending the ROD without preparation
of an SEIS would constitute a failure on DOEs part to live up to legal
requirements stipulated in both DOE and Council on Environmental Quality NEPA
regulations. Thus, I request that you
make a determination that an SEIS must be prepared and take immediate steps
toward its preparation. Given the
serious national security, environmental and safety issues presented by
disposition of surplus weapons plutonium, it is of the highest importance that
DOEs decisions be based on legally required documentation and with full public
participation. To do less would further
endanger the status of the plutonium disposition program and undermine the
admirable non-proliferation goal of removing surplus weapons plutonium from
reuse both in the United States and Russia.
Please
contact me at 202-822-8444 or clements@nci.org
if you have questions about this letter or our position on the need for an
SEIS. I look forward to your timely
response to this request.
Sincerely,
cc: Under Secretary Bob
Card
Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Proliferation Linton Brooks
Assistant
Secretary for Environmental Management Jessie Roberson
Acting
Assistant Deputy Administrator Edward Siskin
Director
Carol Borgstrom, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance
Ms.
Barbara Mazurowski, Manager, Rocky Flats Field Office