November 19,
1998
The
Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
Vice
President of the United States
The
White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. Vice President,
We, the undersigned representatives of organizations concerned with arms
control and nonproliferation, write regarding your initiative to halt Russia's
production of weapons-grade plutonium by converting the cores of its three remaining
nuclear production reactors to demilitarize them.
We strongly
support the arms control and nonproliferation goals of this initiative. Capping
Russia's stock of weapons-grade plutonium, facilitating arms control, and reducing
risks of theft or diversion of bomb-grade materials and associated risks of
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are all objectives we enthusiastically
share.
However, the United States now confronts a critical decision in the core-conversion
initiative -- whether the fuel in the new cores should be highly enriched uranium
(HEU), itself a nuclear weapons-grade material subject to risks of theft and
diversion, or low-enriched uranium (LEU), a material that cannot be made into
nuclear weapons.
For two decades the United States has led an international nonproliferation
effort to eliminate use of HEU fuel in civilian reactors -- the Reduced Enrichment
for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program -- due to the obvious risks posed
by civilian commerce in nuclear weapons-grade material. The Clinton Administration explicitly endorsed this objective
in its September 1993 nonproliferation policy statement. Thus, a decision now to adopt HEU fuel as the means of demilitarizing
the Russian reactors would be at cross-purposes with longstanding U.S. nonproliferation
policy.
The
HEU option for converting the reactor cores would entail Russian commerce in
36 metric tons of weapons-grade uranium over a projected ten years, representing
1,440 "significant quantities" by IAEA standards and sufficient for
650 gun-type nuclear weapons of the type once built by South Africa.
Equally alarming, the fuel is to be in a form highly susceptible
to theft and diversion, amid continuing U.S. concerns about the adequacy of
physical security of Russian transport arrangements and at Russian facilities
where the fuel would be fabricated, stored, and used.
Theft or diversion of even a small fraction of this material could have
grave consequences for U.S. and international security.
By contrast,
converting the Russian reactors to LEU cores would achieve the objective of
halting weapons-grade plutonium production, without inadvertently raising proliferation
risks. A recent feasibility study,
prepared by Russian scientists with the assistance of the U.S. Argonne National
Laboratory, concludes that conversion of the "reactor cores to LEU is feasible."
Moreover, "the preliminary cost assessment has not revealed any
significant difference in the fuel-cycle cost of conversion with either LEU
or HEU fuels if storage is chosen for spent fuel disposal."
The Russian study projects the first of the three reactors could be converted
to an LEU core in March 2002. While
this is nominally a 15-month delay beyond scheduled HEU conversion, Russian
officials have indicated repeatedly that the HEU schedule is unrealistic.
More likely, the LEU option would result in a delay of only seven months
or less, a small price to pay for avoiding 3.6 metric tons annually of new HEU
commerce.
We are aware that certain interested parties within Russia would prefer
to implement the conversion with HEU fuel, but because the United States has
not yet disbursed to Russia the bulk of $80 million appropriated for core conversion,
you still have significant leverage. We urge you (1) to ensure that no further funds are disbursed
that could in any way facilitate HEU core conversion, (2) to provide funding
expeditiously to facilitate the LEU conversion option, and (3) to encourage
Russia to abandon the HEU option in favor of the LEU option.
Thank you for your attention to this urgent national security matter.
Sincerely,
Todd Perry
Paul Leventhal
Washington Representative
President
Union of Concerned Scientists
Nuclear
Control Institute
Frank von Hippel
John Isaacs
Professor
President
Princeton University
Council for a Livable
World
David Albright
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
President
President
Institute for Science and International
Security
Arms Control Association
Joseph Cirincione
Tom
Cochran
Senior Associate
Director, Nuclear Program
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
Natural Resources Defense Council
Alan Kuperman
Amb. (Ret.) Jonathan Dean
Senior Policy Analyst
Advisor on International Security
Nuclear Control Institute
Union of Concerned Scientists
cc:
Hon. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Hon. Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor
Hon. William
Cohen, Secretary of Defense
Hon. Pete Domenici,
U.S. Senate
Hon. John Holum,
Under Secretary of State (Acting)
Hon. Richard
Lugar, U.S. Senate
Hon. Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy
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