June 25, 1998
Laura S.H. Holgate
Special Coordinator for Cooperative Threat Reduction
USD(P)/ASD(ISP)/TRP/CTR
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
Dear Ms. Holgate:
We write regarding the important U.S. initiative to convert the cores of Russia's three
remaining weapons-production reactors and thereby eliminate Russian production of
separated, weapons-grade plutonium
As you know, a joint U. S.-Russian effort is currently underway to explore the feasibility
of two alternative replacement cores -- one utilizing weapons-grade, highly enriched
uranium (HEU), the other non-weapons-usable, low-enriched uranium (LEU). As you approach a
previously announced deadline of July 1, 1998 for selecting a path forward, we urge you to
avoid choosing HEU -- a choice that would be strategically wrong and politically
indefensible.
We strongly oppose conversion to HEU because this path would create vulnerabilities and
risks that outweigh the benefits of halting plutonium production. Conversion of the
Russian reactors to HEU would be a net negative for U.S. national security for two
reasons:
1. The resulting processing, transportation and storage of this nuclear-weapons
material would significantly increase proliferation and terrorism risks; and
2. Facilitating use of HEU fuel on a massive scale would undermine two decades of U.S.
leadership of an international effort to eliminate use of such fuel worldwide -- the
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program -including a joint U.
S.- Russian effort to eliminate its use in research reactors in and supplied by the former
Soviet Union.
By contrast, conversion of the three production reactors to LEU would have only beneficial
impacts -- terminating Russian weapons-grade plutonium production without increasing commerce
in another nuclear weapons-grade material. Preliminary results of a joint U. S.-Russian
study indicate that conversion to LEU is feasible and cost-effective and would result in
only about a six-month delay in conversion. Such a delay is a small price to pay for the
substantial national- security and non-proliferation benefits of choosing the LEU path.
Some argue that the United States must proceed now to fund Russia's fabrication of HEU
fuel to ensure conversion of one of the reactors by the year 2000, the original target
date. But for the reasons stated above, this would be an arbitrary and short-sighted
decision -- and would likely encourage Russia to proceed with HEU cores for its
other two production reactors. Moreover, a decision to spend U.S. taxpayer dollars to
increase commerce in bomb-grade uranium in Russia could not withstand scrutiny by Congress
and the press.
The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, which has assumed the task of funding the core
conversion program, plays a critical role. We urge you to withhold all U.S. funding to
Russia for fabrication of even a single HEU core, and to channel your resources instead
into expediting the LEU option, including immediate provision of funds for fabrication of
LEU elements for required test irradiation.
If handled prudently, this initiative could significantly promote U. S. interests in
reducing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism If handled inappropriately,
however, the initiative could backfire, increasing such risks and undermining the
U.S. national interest.
Thank you for your attention to this important national security matter. We would be
pleased to discuss it further with you.
Sincerely,
Paul Leventhal
Thomas Cochran
Alan Kuperman
President
Natural Resources
Senior Policy Analyst
Nuclear Control
Institute
Defense Council
Nuclear
Control Institute
cc: Leon Fuerth
Rose Gottemoeller
Leonard Spector
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