September
12, 2000
Prof. Gert Weisskirchen
Speaker, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Social Democratic Party
Berlin, Germany
[Letter sent to several SPD members of the German Bundestag]
Opposition
to Export of Siemens MOX Plant to Russia
Dear Professor Weisskirchen:
I am writing to you in connection with your party's impending consideration of the
German Government's plan to export the unfinished Siemens mixed-oxide ("MOX")
fuel plant to Russia, where it would be used to turn excess Russian weapons plutonium into
power reactor fuel.
The Nuclear Control Institute is an independent, non-profit, research and advocacy
center that concentrates on military and civilian plutonium policy issues. We are strongly opposed to this plan on the basis
of important security and safety concerns. These
concerns relate to the vulnerability of the warhead plutonium to theft and diversion, and
to the increased probability and consequences of a severe accident in which this MOX fuel
is used to replace some or all of the conventional fuel in Russia's VVER nuclear reactors.
If implemented, the plan to use recovered warhead plutonium as an ingredient in
nuclear reactor fuel would increase security risks associated with the processing,
transport, and use of this weapons material. Despite
the efforts of the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. national laboratories, fissile
material in Russia remains inadequately protected and vulnerable to insider and outsider
threats because of weak material control and accounting procedures. Instead of removing weapons-usable nuclear
material from circulation, the "MOX" plan would involve more processing and
transport than would the other disposal option---"immobilization" of the
plutonium in highly radioactive waste.
In addition, the MOX plan would lead to significant additional hazards in the event
of a severe accident at a nuclear power plant operating with MOX fuel rather than with a
full core of conventional low-enriched uranium. We
calculate that an increase of 25 per cent in latent cancer fatalities would result from
such an accident with warhead-plutonium MOX fuel.[1] Even this alarming consequence would be magnified
further because of Russia's plan to mix reactor-grade plutonium, a more toxic form, into
this fuel for the purpose of concealing the original isotopic composition of the military
plutonium. Our analysis has found that
Russia's VVER reactors require major safety upgrades if they are to use MOX fuel. Any use of MOX in Russia will increase the
radiation effects to which Germany could be exposed in the event of a severe reactor
accident in Russia.
The objective of transforming warhead plutonium into a form not immediately usable
in nuclear weapons is worthy, but the MOX plan is the wrong way to proceed. Given real-world concerns about the adequacy of
security and safety measures in Russia, we believe it foolhardy to export a MOX
fabrication plant to Russia. Fabrication and
use of MOX fuel has been rejected as too dangerous to pursue in Germany; the wherewithal
to pursue such a program in Russia should not now be transferred by Germany. There is a strong German national interest in
rejecting this transfer: the consequences of
nuclear theft or nuclear accidents in Russia do not respect national frontiers, including
Germany's. Use of plutonium should now be
minimized and eliminated, not expanded.
We wish to underscore that disposition of excess military plutonium does not depend
upon use of MOX fuel because this mission can be accomplished by immobilizing the
plutonium in highly radioactive, glassified waste for direct disposal---a process known as
vitrification. We do not favor an alternative
approach of turning warhead plutonium into "bad" or "sub-spec" MOX
pellets, for insertion in highly radioactive, spent fuel assemblies. Bad MOX would have to be fabricated in a MOX
plant, such as the Hanau facility, and the plant could be modified later on to fabricate
"good" MOX suitable for use in reactors.
The best approach, we believe, is to serve the cause of both nuclear
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament by laying the Siemens MOX plant to rest, once
and for all. This plant should not be allowed
to be resuscitated to provide the basis for a plutonium fuel program in Russia. If approved for export, the Siemens MOX plant will
play a key role in establishing a plutonium fuel cycle in Russia, a key objective of which
is construction of new plutonium "breeder" reactors, beginning with a new
reactor designated BN-800.
Thus, for non-proliferation reasons, as well as the important safety dividend of
avoiding use of plutonium fuel in reactors, NCI strongly opposes the MOX approach to
military plutonium disposition. We appeal for
your party's leadership to attain this objective by rejecting the proposed export of the
Siemens MOX plant to Russia, as well as any funding necessary to export the facility.
Thank you for your consideration of these views.
We ask that you share this letter with your SPD colleagues.
Sincerely,
Paul Leventhal
President