Overview of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons
Zachary Davis
Z Division
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
The
nuclear nonproliferation regime is a combination of domestic laws,
international institutions, technical arrangements, and bilateral agreements
all of which is held together by skillful diplomacy and a little smoke and
mirrors. Our panel is going to evaluate the effectiveness of the technical and
legal barriers that have been established to maintain the separation between
civil and military applications of nuclear technology. We are going to approach
it two ways.
First,
we will look at two country case studies. Dr. George Perkovich of the W. Alton
Jones Foundation, who is a friend and colleague, will address the cases of
India and Iran. As most people here are aware, George is the author of an award
winning book, India's Nuclear Bomb, which is widely considered to be the
most definitive book on that subject.
Looking
back on the history of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is useful to
ask ourselves: How effective were the instruments that were put in place? How
effective were the US nonproliferation laws and policies with respect to India.
What was the net effect of the conditions on the supply of nuclear technology
that are enshrined in the Atomic Energy Act, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,
and other important legislation that was intended to constrain Indias nuclear
weapons program. Did US laws and policies successfully delay and defer New
Delhis decision-making regarding its use of civil nuclear technology to build
nuclear weapons? Without US restrictions, where would Indias nuclear weapons
program be today?
There
are some that suggest that US nonproliferation policy merely antagonized India
without stopping their nuclear bomb program. Critics point to the sanctions
policy that was put in place after the May 1998 tests as proof of the
ineffectiveness of U.S. nonproliferation efforts with India, which they argue
only impeded efforts to improve relations with a prospective ally and fellow
democracy. Nonproliferation, from this perspective, is more trouble than its
worth. Some would even acceed to Indias longstanding request for nuclear
technology transfers, even though such transfers would require major revisions
of U.S. nonproliferation laws and policies to accommodate India.
There
are cracks developing in the nonproliferation regimes practices and
institutions. In particular, I'm referring to the Nuclear Supplier's Guidelines
policy of requiring full scope safeguards as a condition of supply. Russia is
disregarding its NSG full scope safeguards commitment so it can sell reactors
to India. What are the long-term consequences of such violations of the full
scope safeguards standard of international behavior? How will the breakdown of
NSG standards effect proliferation elsewhere? These are questions that George
will have an opportunity to address in his remarks.
India
is a case where we can look backwards to see how civil nuclear technology
contributed to their nuclear weapons program. Iran is a case study that
requires us to look forward. Will Iran follow Indias example and use its civil
nuclear technology infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons? Of course, Iran
is different because it is a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty, but then
questions arise about the long-term health of the nonproliferation regime and
the NPT itself.
Do
the cracks in the regime that I referred to make it easier for Russia, and
perhaps other countries, to provide sensitive nuclear technology to Iran? And
if Iran diverts civil nuclear technology or material to military uses, would
the IAEA detect it, and would the members of the NPT take enforcement
action? These issues will be addressed
by the Honorable Larry Scheinman, who is professor emeritus, renowned scholar,
and former assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He
will discuss the health of the regime itself. Is the nuclear non-proliferation
regime in trouble? Is the regime likely
to unravel? Are the legal, multi-lateral,
and technical barriers that were put in place to maintain the separation
between civil and military nuclear activities wearing thin? If the regime is in decline, how long will
it take before it loses credibility: five, ten, or twenty-five years?
Larry
Scheinman is the worlds leading scholar on the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The IAEA is a unique institution and its international safeguard system
is an essential component of the nonproliferation regime. The answers to many
of the questions that we will explore on this panel depend on the effectiveness
of IAEA safeguards. Will the IAEA meet
the challenges posed by non-NPT states India, Israel, and Pakistan, and
challenges from within the NPT by treaty members such as North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq? And, central to the purpose of the conference, how will the IAEA handle
the challenges posed by growing stockpiles of fissile material. Is the IAEA up to the job?
There
have been a number of reforms instituted to revitalize the IAEA and make the
safeguards system stronger, more robust, more intrusive, more reliable, and
more credible. But
questions persist about the so-called 93+2, or strengthened safeguards system.
With its meager budget already stretched to the breaking point, how can IAEA safeguards
be expected to expand the scope of its coverage to include more fissile
material, more facilities, and a wider range of activities?
We've
heard mention a couple of times today the nuclear bargain between the nuclear
weapon states and the developing countries. The bargain has two parts. First,
the non-weapons states are promised access to civil nuclear technology as a
part of their pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. Second, the nuclear weapon
states promise to reduce their arsenals and move in the direction of
disarmament. But expectations are outpacing results on the nuclear bargain, and
these stresses are becoming increasingly evident at the NPT review
conferences. We even see signs of
countries threatening to quit the treaty. I hope Larry can give us a sense of
whether we should take these threats seriously. Is the treaty in trouble?
When I look at the challenges to the regime, I don't feel optimistic. In light of the demands that are being placed on the IAEA, the funding shortfalls, the strains from outside and inside the NPT, the new missions that are being slated for the IAEA such as verifying a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and verifying the disposal of excess material from US and Russian warheads it is not clear to me how the regime can live up to our expectations. Perhaps most importantly, the political support from the US and other key countries that is necessary to sustain the regime is not evident.
We
will conclude our panel with a response to the presentations by Paul Leventhal,
who will present his scorecard for the past performance of US nonproliferation
laws and policy and assess the challenges ahead for the regime. I am sure we
will all go home feeling wiser, if not optimistic.
Let
us begin the panel presentations with the cases studies by George Perkovich.