STATEMENT OF EDWIN LYMAN, PHD
SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR
CONTROL INSTITUTE
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Briefing on
Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research Programs and Performance
May 10, 2001
My name is Edwin Lyman. Since 1995, I have been the Scientific
Director of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in Washington. I would like to thank the Commission for the
privilege of serving on the Expert Panel and the opportunity today to present
NCI's views on the future of NRC safety research.
A
brief review of the early history of the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research provides useful insights for today's discussion. NCI President Paul Leventhal, as a U.S.
Senate aide, helped to draft the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, which
separated the regulatory and promotional functions of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC).
The drafters of the original
Senate-passed bill wanted to ensure that the NRC maintain a safety research
capability that was independent of ERDA, DOE's predecessor agency. To this end, the Senate bill provided for an
Office of Nuclear Safety Research within NRC, which had a broad mandate to
engage in or contract for research deemed necessary for the discharge of NRC's
functions. The House bill essentially
provided for NRC's research needs to be met by ERDA on a reimbursable basis.
The legislation that emerged
from conference established an Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), but
one restricted to "confirmatory assessment" of the adequacy of NRC
regulations to ensure safe operation of facilities under NRC's
jurisdiction. The conference report
affirmed that NRC would have an "independent" research capability,
but stressed that to avoid duplicating the research conducted by ERDA, NRC
should draw upon ERDA's findings.
However,
confirmatory assessment was rejected three years later by Congress. Citing the findings of a Ford
Foundation-sponsored report critical of the limitations on the scope of work
performed by RES, Congress amended the ERA to provide for NRC research on the
development of new or improved safety systems.
The addition of so-called "anticipatory" research to the NRC's
portfolio gave RES a mandate closer to the original intent of the Senate
version of the ERA.
This
historical account is noteworthy today because the independence that is so
fundamental to the RES mission as originally conceived --- independence not
only from DOE and licensees but also from other NRC program offices --- has been put at risk by the severe cuts
in the RES budget over the last decade and an excessive focus on linking
research goals to specific objectives.
These developments have also adversely affected the ability of RES to
carry out the important anticipatory research function specifically assigned to
it by Congress in 1977.
At
a time when many stakeholders perceive that industry influence over NRC
regulatory activities is increasing, when formal public participation is being
restricted and when there is growing pressure from Capitol Hill for NRC to
expedite license renewals and the licensing of new nuclear plants, the
preservation of a robust and independent RES is more critical than ever. NCI believes that most of the research
projects pursued by RES are sensible and technically justified, and favors
funding for many of the worthy projects that RES would like to pursue but
remain unfunded. Thus we support
efforts to restore the budget of RES to a level at which it can effectively
perform its statutory function. But
there should also be a renewed effort by NRC management to ensure that research
sponsored by RES is conducted in an objective manner, and that the results of
the research are freely distributed to the public without "spin."
I
would like to briefly mention a few examples that illustrate the importance of
maintaining an independent NRC research and testing capability. It is essential that RES be able not only to
review industry-supplied data, but also to confirm such data through
independent experiments or analysis when questions arise regarding the adequacy
of the supplier's data. In addition to
serving as an independent check, this process provides a mechanism for public
access to detailed safety information that is largely deemed proprietary in
industry submittals.
One example involves NRC's
approval process for advanced fuel cladding types such as the
niobium-containing alloys ZIRLO and M5, which are both being used in U.S.
reactors today. Recently, NRC became
aware of experimental data on the Russian-origin cladding E110 --- an alloy
very similar in composition to ZIRLO and M5 --- indicating that E110 could
become embrittled much more rapidly than standard Zircaloy during a
loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
Subsequently it was revealed that Framatome ANP (the manufacturer of M5)
was aware of this data for some time but did not inform NRC, although it was
performing additional tests to satisfy German regulators.
While Framatome ANP and
Westinghouse (the manufacturer of ZIRLO) have now provided (largely
proprietary) data to NRC that purportedly shows their alloys to perform better
than E110 under LOCA conditions, the fundamental basis for this difference in
performance is not understood. It
appears that small differences in composition can result in significantly
different cladding behavior. If this is
indeed the case, then additional studies need to be performed to augment the
database of clad material properties as a function of composition, for both
normal and accident conditions. To this
end, RES has asked the vendors for samples of both unirradiated cladding
material and irradiated fuel rods for the RES-sponsored LOCA fuel testing
program being conducted at Argonne National Laboratory, but at the last public
meeting on this subject in February 2001, this request was not enthusiastically
received by the vendors. In NCI's view,
RES testing is essential for resolving this issue and restoring public
confidence in the safety of these advanced cladding materials. Such testing should also become a routine
part of the qualification process for new fuel types.
A related issue involves
NRC's research program to support licensing of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in Duke
Power's Catawba and McGuire reactors.
RES Director Ashok Thadani told the Expert Panel that without the
availability of data on MOX fuel performance from abroad --- data which is
largely proprietary --- NRC would not have the technical basis to license MOX
fuel in the U.S. However, the database
contains significant gaps (for instance, concerning high-burnup fuel behavior
under severe accident conditions) and its applicability to the U.S. program
will be limited. Moreover, these gaps
will not be closed by the fuel qualification program proposed by MOX licensee
Duke Cogema Stone and Webster (DCS) and approved by DOE, which does not address
severe accident or storage issues.
In a letter last year, RES
sought a commitment from DOE (which is responsible for all MOX licensing costs)
that samples of irradiated MOX lead test assemblies (LTAs) would be provided to
RES for independent testing at Argonne, a request that DOE has denied. This denial is unacceptable because DOE
arguably has a conflict of interest as a result of its deep investment in the
success of the MOX program. RES does
not have the authority to make its request directly to DCS. NCI urges the Commission to require NRR to
make it clear to DCS that timely licensing of MOX fuel use will depend on
complying with the RES request for LTA samples so that the concerns of RES can
be fully resolved.
NCI does not support budget
increases for all types of anticipatory research. In particular, the significant costs associated with licensing
new reactor types, especially those based on innovative technologies, should be
regarded as an essential component of the economic case for advanced reactor
deployment. Thus neither taxpayers nor
NRC licensees that have no interest in advanced reactors should be obligated to
shoulder these costs. Also, difficult
policy issues arise with regard to the extent to which RES should provide
technical guidance for developers of new reactor designs to expedite future
licensing, given the significant overlap between the work that RES would have
to perform to support such efforts and the fundamental research that should be
considered part of new reactor development.
The basic separation of nuclear regulation from development, which is
the cornerstone of the ERA, should not be breached.
One cannot understate the
importance to RES of public confidence in its independence and
objectivity. Unfortunately, RES still
has a long way to go to gain this confidence.
It appears that the there is a tendency on the part of some RES staff to
recast research findings that do not support prior NRC decisions in a more
favorable light. The example with which
I am most familiar is the issue of ice condenser containment vulnerability
during certain severe accidents. NCI is
particularly concerned with this problem because of the plan to use MOX fuel in
Duke Power's Catawba and McGuire ice condenser plants, which according to our
estimates will increase the latent cancer severe accident risk to the public in
the vicinity of these reactors by 25 percent.
A thorough and fair
assessment of containment performance must be an essential prerequisite for NRC
approval of MOX use in these plants.
However, the discouraging experiences of Dr. Kenneth Bergeron, a
researcher who recently retired from Sandia National Laboratories, provide
evidence of ongoing interference by NRC management in RES-sponsored projects in
which he has participated, including a study of ice-condenser containment
safety. Dr. Bergeron was a co-author of
the study (NUREG/CR-6427), performed under NRC contract and released last year
after a long delay, that analyzed the response of ice condenser containments to
severe accident pressure loads. Dr.
Bergeron has spoken of the chilling effect that budget cuts for severe accident
research in the 1990s have had on the objectivity of contracted research. Dr. Bergeron gave me permission to quote him
directly here:
"In the case of the ice
condenser (IC) report, I personally resisted pressure to whitewash the issues
for four years...I think the IC report underestimates the safety issues
substantially. Time and time again, the
project staff were asked to look into issues in greater detail if there seemed
a possibility that the details would reveal a rosier picture, and time and time
again other issues that might yield evidence of additional problems were
glossed over."
Dr.
Bergeron is also very critical of the "peer review" process used by
NRC to oversee severe accident research, which he has called a
"perversion" of the usual protocol of scientific peer review because
the biases of the peer reviewers have an undue influence on project
development.
Clearly,
any perception that managerial bias influences the outcome of NRC-sponsored
research is very damaging to RES, as well as to the Commission, and renewed and
vigilant efforts must be made to ensure that RES is insulated from political
and budgetary pressure. Otherwise, RES
will not be regarded by the public as a credible source of safety information,
and the Commission's credibility will likewise be damaged.
In
summary, a big part of the problem is the requirement that RES activities
conform to the NRC performance goal of "reducing unnecessary regulatory
burden." A fundamental goal of
safety research is to reduce uncertainties and provide a more precise
determination of safety margins. The
results of such efforts may uncover margins that are unacceptably small as well
as unnecessarily large. To regain
public confidence in NRC's objectivity, RES must demonstrate that it is willing
to deliver bad news as well as good, and the other NRC offices must be willing
to respond promptly and appropriately to RES findings.
Thank
you for your attention.