• The Department of Energy (DOE) stores and transports weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium nationwide. DOE possesses enough material to make as many as 100,000 nuclear weapons.

• DOE hires private entities such as Wackenhut Corporation and University of California to protect nuclear weapons facilities. Since 1992, the number of protective forces has decreased by 40%.

• DOE conducts mock terrorist attacks to test security, often employing U.S. military forces to take on the role of terrorists. DOE identifies three terrorist threat scenarios to physical security:
  • Theft of weapons-grade nuclear materials;
    
  • Radiological sabotage by a suicidal terrorist most likely by a truck bomb or conventional explosives inside a facility dispersing tons of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium into the atmosphere; and
    
  • Creation and explosion of a home madenuclear device.

• Even though notified in advance when and where tests will occur, protective forces fail tests more than 50% of the time.

• DOE managers have dumbed-down tests to make a passing grade, preventing attackers from using such commercially-available items as armor-piercing bullets and grenades. Navy SEALs refused to participate in exercises any longer because the tests were so unrealistic.

• The following examples of security failures, by necessity, are not recent which allows them to be discussed in an unclassified forum:
  
  • In a 1998 test at the Rocky Flats nuclear production facility, Navy SEALs successfully stole enough material to make multiple nuclear weapons.
  • 
    
  • In an October 2000 test at a Los Alamos facility, the terrorists had enough time to construct and detonate a nuclear device.

• Several key solutions could improve security problems at DOE:
  
  • Under the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, close unneeded facilities and consolidate weapons-grade nuclear materials into fewer, more easily-defended underground locations;
    
  • Immobilize excess nuclear materials so that they can no longer be used by terrorists;
    
  • Take security oversight out of DOE so that an independent and more rigorous analysis can take place;
    
  • Improve the effectiveness of DOEs protective forces by increasing the size of the force and upgrading outdated training, weaponry, and security tactics; and
    
  • In the short term, assign military units with SWAT capability to guard special nuclear materials inventories.

Click on the link to view a copy of POGOs recently released report, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk.

The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) investigates, exposes, and seeks to remedy systemic abuses of power, mismanagement, and subservience by the federal government to powerful special interests. Founded in 1981, POGO is a politically-independent, nonprofit watchdog that strives to promote a government that is accountable to the citizenry.

Contact POGO if you have inside information concerning abuse of power, mismanagement or subservience to powerful special interests by the federal government.