New Steps to Secure Nuclear Material in the Bush Administration


Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

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Abstract

The Vision - Where Do We Want to Be in 10-20 Years?

- Nuclear weapons and stockpiles of nuclear explosive material (separated plutonium and HEU) drastically reduced worldwide
- All nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive material worldwide sustainably secured and accounted for, to stringent standards
- A strengthened safeguards system in place, capable both of detecting diversions from declared activities, and detecting covert activities
- Effective export control systems in place worldwide, greatly reducing proliferators’ access to technology to support a nuclear weapons program
- Nuclear complexes reconfigured to size appropriate to post-Cold War missions, with budgets sufficient to sustain them, excess nuclear experts sustainably re-employed
- Sufficient monitoring and transparency to confirm above steps have been taken
- Sustained or expanded energy contribution from nuclear power, with reduced proliferation impact - including reduction in proliferation-sensitive activities
- Political and security measures taken to reduce states' demand for nuclear weapons and strengthen the nonproliferation regime

"The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states." -- Baker-Cutler rept.

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