Toward a New Security Framework

Remarks of Sam Nunn
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Thank you, Lee, for having me here today. Lee Hamilton is one of the most honorable, capable, effective and respected public officials I have ever known. The Almanac of American Politics once wrote that Lee Hamilton is "one of the few members of Congress who is genuinely respected - and spoken of in hushed tones - on all sides." This proves the point that in Washington, if you have to say something positive and nice about someone, you say it quietly and softly. Lee - all of us who worked with you in the Congress are delighted that you are continuing your outstanding leadership for our nation at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

In the aftermath of September 11, Americans have demonstrated heroism, compassion, generosity, and unity. The response of those at the center of this tragedy has helped restore our national confidence, inspire our pride, and deepen our faith in our values. We have reminded the world that we are a caring and a principled nation, whose citizens trace their ancestry to every area of the earth, yet who live together as one nation, under universal values of freedom, equality, human rights, and respect for life. Our values could not be more fundamentally different from the terrorists. They took their lives to kill people. Our rescuers gave their lives to save people.

Our citizens have rallied behind President Bush to bring justice to the perpetrators of this horrible attack and long-term security to our nation. President Bush has pledged a war on terrorism and it must be fought with all the means in our power—skillful diplomacy, improved intelligence, international financial pressure, and the use of our military might. He has made it clear the enemy is not Islam, but a virulent form of radical terrorism that perverts the Holy Koran, and attacks humanity itself.

The Bush team has made impressive progress in building broad-based international coalitions against terror with different nations playing different roles:

- The United Nations, China, India, and Pakistan have condemned this terror;
- NATO has declared the attacks on America as attacks on the Alliance and each member;
- Russia has offered the use of its airspace and intelligence;
- Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have broken off relations with the Taliban, leaving it the most isolated regime in the world, increasingly at war with its own people;
- Even Iran, who in the past twenty years has agreed with us on very little, has said that the perpetrators of these crimes need to be identified and brought to justice.

This unity at home and abroad will not make our campaign easy or quick, but it does make it achievable over time

- We must hunt down those responsible for the September 11 attack and prevent future attacks;
With the help of our friends, we must disrupt and eliminate terrorist organizations and cells around the world;

We must improve our human intelligence and our ability to sort out and derive meaning and understanding from huge collections of data and information;

We must provide our FBI with the information systems, communication systems, and the legal authority it needs to combat terrorism and cyber-terrorism here at home;

We must give the CIA and the FBI the "green light" to deal with "bad folks" as required to penetrate terrorist groups and protect our nation. This is dangerous, high-risk work, and we must not expect 100 percent success or perfection;

While doing all of this, we must also preserve our basic constitutional protections here at home.

It is essential to mobilize with great urgency when an enemy strikes suddenly and catastrophically. Decisions and actions that would normally occur over 5 to 10 years occur in only a few months. But this accelerated fight against terrorism must be integrated into a broader national security strategy. We must understand what changed on September 11, and what did not change.

What changed September 11 was not our vulnerability to terrorism but our understanding of it. The greatest shock was perhaps not even the sheer loss of life, which was staggering, but the evil, hate and fanaticism behind it. To most Americans, the attack was unthinkable. Now our nation knows better. The terrorists' capacity for killing is limited only by the power of their weapons. We lost our sense of invulnerability but as the world is learning, we also lost our sense of complacency.

What did not change on September 11 is this: The most significant, clear and present danger we face is the threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The question is not whether we must prepare for terrorism or for attacks with weapons of mass destruction. These two threats are not separate but interrelated and reinforcing, and if joined together, become our worst nightmare.

For half a century, the people of the United States and much of the world have lived under constant threat from nuclear weapons. Many believe that the end of the Cold War ended the threat. It has not. The danger of a conventional war with the Soviet Union escalating into a nuclear holocaust has almost disappeared, but other threats have, in many ways, multiplied and grown more complex and dangerous. The specter of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a clear case of this.

During the Cold War, our goal was to deter a Soviet Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe and a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union. We pursued this by building and deploying tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Deterrence was designed to work against nations, not non-state actors who may have nothing to protect and nothing to lose. Today, the most likely threat is not nuclear missiles launched from a nation-state, but biological weapons in an aerosol can, chemical weapons in a subway or ventilation system, or nuclear or radiological weapons in the belly of a ship or the back of a truck, delivered by a group with no return address.

As these new risks have grown over the past decade, our policies have not kept pace, and this has opened an increasingly dangerous gap between the threats and our response. This gap must be closed.
The President has called for "a new framework for security and stability." The recent terrorist strikes, the urgency of the threats, the concern in Congress and world capitals, and the eagerness of President Bush to engage the issue, give us a chance to make changes that can advance the security of America and the world.

**The Emerging Threats**

Ten years ago, a communist empire broke apart, leaving as its legacy 30,000 nuclear warheads and enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make 60,000 more; 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons; missile-ready smallpox, and tens of thousands of scientists who know how to make weapons and missiles, but don't know how to feed their families.

Russia's dysfunctional economy and eroded security systems have undercut controls on these weapons, materials, and know-how—and increased the risk that they could flow to terrorist groups or hostile forces. Russia's early warning system has also seriously eroded, and some have suggested that their command and control, which for years helped prevent a calamitous mistake, is no longer assuredly reliable.

As these new threats have multiplied, both the U.S. and Russia have continued to invest large resources in nuclear strategies left over from the Cold War days: the maintenance of strategic forces with thousands of nuclear warheads ready for immediate launch. In today's multi-polar world with its multiplicity of new threats, it no longer makes sense for either nation to stake its security so disproportionately on its ability to promptly launch a nuclear attack with thousands of warheads. These nuclear postures don't fit the facts, threats and demands of the day. They are not relevant in stopping proliferation, they compress decision time for each President to a matter of a very few minutes, they make an accident or misjudgment more likely, particularly with Russia's diminished weapons survivability and decreased warning, and they multiply the consequences of a mistake by either Russia or the United States.

The threats we faced during the Cold War—a Soviet nuclear strike or an invasion of Europe—were threats made more dangerous by Soviet strength. The new threats we face today—false warnings, accidental launches, the risk of weapons, materials, and know-how falling into the wrong hands—are threats made more dangerous by Russia's weakness. We addressed the Cold War's threats by confrontation with Moscow. There can be no realistic comprehensive plan to defend America against weapons of mass destruction that does not depend on cooperation with Moscow.

**The Elements of a New Security Framework**

*Reshaping Nuclear Forces*

In his May 1 speech at the National Defense University, President Bush made a public commitment to "change the size, the composition and the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over." He has also pledged to achieve a "credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies."

There should be broad common ground support for the President's pledge. There is a growing realization that our current nuclear force posture was designed for a world that no longer exists; that stability is weakened because symmetry on the Russian side is in doubt; that we need to re-define deterrence; and, that we can achieve it with far fewer weapons. There is also
growing understanding that Russia's weakened economic condition and degraded warning systems, coupled with our large nuclear rapid strike potential, are moving Russia to a force posture that is more reliant on "launch-on-warning" and more prone to accidents and miscalculations.

President Bush has also said: "Today, for two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch." Here, too, there is growing agreement. During the Cold War, quick launch status carried important deterrent value. But it also came with a high risk that it could force a quick - and catastrophic - decision. Today, for "two nations at peace," the risk we are both running is greater than the risk we are reducing. We must expand decision time in both the United States and Russia to reduce toward zero the chance of a catastrophic mistake made from too little information and too little time.

Changing the force posture will require bold and determined Presidential leadership. It will also require new thinking about how to speed the pace of nuclear force structure change by both the U.S. and Russia without losing the transparency, verifiability and stability that are the benefits of traditional arms control. Yet, the large value of these aims should provoke a common purpose—and a basis for reaching consensus.

**Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

There is also common ground agreement on the danger of proliferation. Osama bin Laden has said acquiring weapons of mass destruction is "a religious duty." That ought to alarm us, because the events of September 11 give us little hope that if these terrorists had them, they would hesitate to use them. And so we find ourselves, at the dawn of the new century, in a new arms race: Terrorists are racing to get weapons of mass destruction; we ought to be racing to stop them.

We have taken important steps, but we need giant strides. Over the last ten years, we worked with Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to recover and destroy 423 ballistic missiles, 383 ballistic missile launchers, 85 bombers, 483 long-range air-launched cruise missiles, 352 submarine missile launchers, 209 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 19 strategic missile submarines. In addition, 194 nuclear test tunnels have been sealed, and more than 5,500 warheads on strategic systems aimed at the United States have now been deactivated. Most Americans don't know this. The United States and Russia cooperated in preventing the birth of three new nuclear powers, one of the great accomplishments of the Clinton Administration.

To reduce threats to our own security, we have helped the Russians secure their nuclear weapons and materials to prevent theft and accidents; helped them convert nuclear weapons facilities to civilian purposes; and helped them employ hundreds of their weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits. We also passed legislation in 1996 that created the framework for homeland defense. It has helped 120 U.S. cities prepare for the possibility of biological and chemical attacks and authorized the Defense and Energy Departments to carry out research and development on means to detect weapons of mass destruction. Funds were also authorized to purchase equipment capable of detecting and interdicting weapons of mass destruction and to assist border guards in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in blocking the unauthorized transfer of weapons of mass destruction.

These were not the accomplishments of one political party. The original Nunn-Lugar legislation was authored by a Republican and a Democrat; passed with Republican support by a Democratic Congress and signed by a
Republican President. Later, the same legislation was passed with Democratic support by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democratic President. In 1996, Nunn-Lugar-Domenici had similar support. We need to build on this record of bipartisanship to take the added steps compelled by the present dangers we face.

We need a broader world consensus, and we need it soon. We need China's active cooperation in halting the flow of missile and weapons technology. Europe, also, must take on its fair share of the burden of fighting proliferation and helping get nuclear, chemical and biological materials under safe and secure control.

We must increase our resources and shorten the timetable to reduce these risks. Early this year, a distinguished bipartisan task force headed by Former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler published a major report on the need to secure Russian weapons, materials, and know-how. The panel declared it "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States," and called for a four-fold funding increase for these threat reduction efforts. We have not yet heeded their warnings or taken their advice.

**Missile Defense**

The final element of the new security framework, and one whose debate has been set aside since the terrorist attacks, but not because it has been resolved, is missile defense. The proliferation of missile technology, as well as the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, poses the danger that a rogue state could develop the capability to launch a nuclear missile at a U.S. city. From my perspective, this threat is not an immediate danger, but it cannot be dismissed because it is more distant or because it would - for the attacking nation - amount to national suicide. I believe, however, that protecting our deployed military forces is a much more urgent threat, and mobile theater defense should be our priority focus.

Over the longer run, to the extent that we can develop the means to shield ourselves from attack through a limited missile defense, we should do so-- so long as it does not leave us more vulnerable to threats that are more likely, more immediate, and more potentially devastating. We must understand that threat reduction, diplomacy, cooperation, military power and intelligence are our first line of defense against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and against terrorism. National missile defense is our last line of defense if all else fails. We have to guard against over-investing in our last line of defense and under-investing in all the others. The cost incurred should be proportionate to the threat deterred.

Whether missile defense will cost more than it's worth, or create more problems than it solves, will depend in part on advances in technology and how skillfully we conduct the important diplomacy that a missile defense deployment decision demands. The purpose of the ABM Treaty was to preserve strategic stability by ensuring that neither side would deploy defenses that coupled with prompt hard target kill offensive weapons creates the incentive to strike first—destroying most of your opponent's offensive weapons and leaving you with the ability to defend against those that are left.

This type of posture could lead to a hair trigger on both sides in any confrontation and increases the incentive to build more offensive weapons. Theater defenses are permitted under the ABM Treaty, and there is nothing about limited national defense against an emerging rogue state ballistic missile threat that is inherently incompatible with the Treaty's purpose. I
believe it should be possible to reach an understanding with Russia that allows for the development of missile defense technologies and subsequent deployment and - at the same time - gives both sides assurances that the goals of strategic stability, which were the original purpose of the ABM Treaty, are being preserved.

I believe that we should work to find successor arrangements to the ABM Treaty before going forward with any treaty-ending testing or deployments.

If we are to develop any lasting consensus on this subject, missile defense must be debated as a technology, not a theology—as part of a security framework, not the whole of it. Our goal should not be to deploy a particular defense, but to reduce an overall threat. If we remember this, we have a chance to find common ground on this most contentious of all issues in the new security framework.

**An Integrated Approach**

The fight against terrorism, nuclear force posture, nonproliferation, and missile defense each address separate elements of the response to the threat of weapons of mass destruction. But they should not and must not be formulated into separate policy. The character of one has a strong influence on the effectiveness of the others. That's why they must be considered not separately, but jointly, and woven into a comprehensive defense against weapons of mass destruction—in any form, from any source, on any vehicle, whether triggered by intent or accident by a rogue state or a terrorist group.

When Candidate Bush said at the Citadel: "We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces," he was calling attention to the link between offensive force posture and missile defense. President Bush has tried to make the prospect of missile defenses more palatable to the Russians by discussing it simultaneously with deep reductions in our offensive nuclear forces. This is wise; our offensive posture has an immense impact on the way Russia views our defensive plan.

But to be effective and comprehensive, the new security framework must also integrate the missing link—the link between changes in our offensive and defense systems and the essential cooperation required from Russia and others to prevent the spread of weapons, missiles and materials, and strengthen the global coalition against terrorism.

As Senator Lugar has said: "Funding for limited missile defenses [should] be embedded in a revised and more all-encompassing non-proliferation strategy ... to prevent countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction ....in the first place."

The United States cannot secure dangerous materials, limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction know-how, gather accurate and timely intelligence, eliminate terrorist cells, or apply pressure to rogue regimes without the active cooperation of allies and former adversaries, including Russia and China. Any security initiative that undercuts this essential cooperation could leave us less secure, not more.

In sorting out our priorities, we must elevate facts above fear and analysis above emotion, and be sure that we are making the most of our resources. This must start with an objective, comprehensive intelligence estimate that assesses every major risk, ranks every major threat, and helps us devise a broad strategy that confronts the full range of significant dangers in a way that defends against one without making us more vulnerable to another. This
approach would give the most weight and the most resources to threats that are the most immediate, the most likely, with the greatest consequences. In the absence of an infinite budget, relative risk analysis must be the beginning point in shaping our strategy and allocating our resources—to defend our citizens at home and abroad.

This is a time of tragedy but an immense opportunity, where everything is up for discussion, and great change is possible. The attacks of September 11 have mobilized the world as never before to confront terrorism. We understand the threats. We must expand this cooperation to include a greatly accelerated program of reducing risk from weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush and President Putin will be meeting soon in Texas. They will no doubt be discussing how our two nations—both victims of terrorist attacks—can cooperate to improve global security. Let me close with a few suggestions for Presidential consideration:

1) Both President Bush and President Putin could use the occasion of their coming meeting to commit each nation to a course of action that would ensure that our nuclear weapons and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons materials are safe, secure, and accounted for—with reciprocal monitoring sufficient to assure each other that this is the case. Such was the vision of the recent bipartisan panel report, chaired by former Senate Majority leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler. This will take more time, money and effort then we have so far been willing to invest, but it is central to our security, and it forces us to address the fundamental question: If our objective is to ensure that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials don't fall into the hands of rogue nations and terrorists, is this a priority or an afterthought? If it's an afterthought—after what? What comes before it? If it is a priority, is that reflected in our effort and investment? Are our friends in Asia and Europe doing their share? If not, why not?

2) The events of September 11 gave President Bush very little time to make a very difficult decision—whether to give orders to shoot down a commercial jetliner, filled with passengers. Our current nuclear posture in the U.S. and Russia could provide even less time for each President to decide on a nuclear launch that could destroy our nations. I suggest that the two Presidents issue an order directing their military leaders, in joint consultation and collaboration, to devise operational changes in the nuclear forces of both nations that would reduce toward zero the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation and provide increased launch decision time for each President. Such an order should emphasize that it is the intention of the U.S. and Russia to "stand down" their nuclear forces to the maximum extent practical consistent with the security interests of each country. They could start immediately with those weapons systems that are to be eliminated under the START II Treaty.

3) The two Presidents should also give their blessing and support to a collaboration between the U.S. and Russian Academies of Sciences to address ways to reduce the threat from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and then to expand that collaboration to include scientists in other nations. This initiative may well give momentum to forward-thinking representatives of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, who are willing to think of ways to reduce vulnerabilities to the theft of dangerous pathogens.

4) Finally, when Russia was developing biological weapons, they were also developing vaccines and other pharmaceuticals. When they were devising dissemination mechanisms, they were also working on detectors and
protective devices. At this moment in time, the United States and Russia could combine our biodefense knowledge and scientific expertise and apply these considerable joint resources to defensive and peaceful biological purposes. The two Presidents could promote a bilateral effort to cooperate on our research agendas and build upon what both countries know. This is a research endeavor that could motivate others to join.

If the United States and Russia begin working together as partners in fighting terror and the weapons of mass destruction threat, and encourage others to join, the world will be a different place for our children and grandchildren. We face major challenges, but an historic opportunity. We must seize it now.

Time and circumstance have given us a chance to shape new relationships and to build a new security framework, so that the pain of today will not be known by the children of tomorrow.