Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and Constraints

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Comprehensive analyses of the prospects for nuclear terrorism inevitably address two major considerations: technological and psychological. What is striking about these analyses, however, is the great disparity between the scrupulous attention devoted to technological considerations and the cursory attention given to psychological ones. An example of this disparity is the frequently cited study *Nuclear Theft, Risks and Safeguards* by Mason Willrich and Theodore Taylor, prepared for the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation. The authors provide rigorous analyses of the materials, technology, skills, and resources necessary to construct a crude fission bomb or radiological weapon. They also give thorough attention to the requirements and elements of nuclear safeguards systems. Their attention to detail is scrupulous. In contrast, only 10 of the book's 252 pages are devoted to examining terrorist motivations and intentions, and even that limited treatment is descriptive and superficial.

Thus, we are in the paradoxical position of having a clearer understanding of the interior of the atom than we do of the interior of the mind of the terrorist. As is the case in the broader area of nuclear strategy, absent a clear understanding of the adversary's intentions, the tactics and strategies developed are based primarily on knowledge of terrorists technological capabilities and give insufficient weight to psychological motivations.

Irrational Act or Rational Choice?

In considering the potential for nuclear terrorism, Brian Jenkins observes that the historical record does not contain incidents in which terrorist groups have attempted to acquire fissile material for use in a nuclear device. More-
over, he observes that inflicting mass casualties is usually inconsistent with the goals of terrorist groups. On the other hand, when Jenkins considers the category of psychotic individuals, he is led to observe that “nuts are probably responsible for many of the low-level incidents and nuclear hoaxes” and that “lunatics have been perpetrators of many schemes of mass murder.” He concludes that on the basis of intentions alone, psychotics are potential nuclear terrorists, but in terms of capabilities, they are the least able to acquire nuclear weapons.

Although I agree with the overall thrust of Jenkins’s arguments, an overly quick reading of his analysis could lead to the false conclusion that the major danger is from irrational actors—from psychotic individuals acting alone or in small groups. One could go on to conclude—again falsely—that there is little or no danger from political terrorists, since political terrorist groups tend to guide their decision making in accordance with rational political considerations and it does not seem to be in the rational interest of political terrorist groups to engage in nuclear terrorism. But, as Jenkins would be the first to agree, this thinking revolves around a false dichotomy. In reality, there is a great deal of territory between irrationality and rationality. Moreover, rational terrorists may reason quite logically, but the fixed premises that are at the basis of their rational calculus can lead to a “psycho-logic” with dreadful consequences.

**Terrorist Psycho-logic**

In examining terrorist psycho-logic, it is necessary to utilize three levels of analysis: individual psychology, group psychology, and organizational psychology.

**Individual Psychology**

Comparative studies of terrorist psychology do not indicate a unique terrorist mind. Terrorists do not fit into a specific psychiatric diagnostic category. Indeed, most would be considered to fit within the spectrum of normality. But it is difficult to conceptualize a psychologically normal individual who would carry out an act of mass destruction. An attempt to construct a psychology that would lead an individual to be motivated to carry out an act of nuclear terrorism and have the wherewithal to implement it quickly reveals a paradox. On the one hand, to be motivated to carry out an act of mass destruction suggests profound psychological distortions usually found only in severely disturbed individuals, such as paranoid psychotics. On the other hand, to implement an act of nuclear terrorism requires not only organizational skills but also the ability to work cooperatively with a small team. To
be suffering from major psychopathology, such as paranoid psychotic states, is incompatible with being able to work effectively with a small group.

On the basis of my understanding of terrorist psychology, I agree with Jenkins's observation that the psychotic individuals most strongly motivated to commit acts of nuclear terrorism would be the least able to carry them out, although psychotic individuals could be—and have been—responsible for nuclear hoaxes.

**Psychosocial Vulnerabilities**

Although there is no unique terrorist mind-set, there is a pattern of psychosocial vulnerabilities that renders those who become terrorists particularly susceptible to the powerful influences of group and organizational dynamics. In particular, some data suggest that the act of joining a terrorist group represents an attempt to consolidate an incomplete psychosocial identity. Within the broad array of terrorist groups with their disparate causes, a common feature is an unusually strong motivation to belong that is coupled with a tendency to externalize by seeking outside sources for personal inadequacies.

A major study sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany is illustrative. The study of the epidemiology of terrorism found that one-fourth of terrorists had lost one or both parents by age 14, that a third had been convicted in juvenile court, and that those studied evinced a high frequency of job and educational failure. The lives of the terrorists before joining were characterized by social isolation and personal failure. For these lonely, alienated individuals on the margins of society, the terrorist group was to become the family they never had.

Alienation from the family is characteristic of a major class of terrorists whom I term the anarchic ideologues. This class, of which the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades are examples, have turned against the generation of their parents, which is identified with the establishment. They are dissident to parents loyal to the regime.

In apparent contrast, the nationalist separatists, such as ETA of the Basques and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), are carrying on a family mission they are loyal to families dissident to the establishment. They are not, however, at one with their societies in spite of their family identification. Thus they too have fragmented psychosocial identities, and for them too, joining a terrorist group is an attempt to consolidate their identities.

To recapitulate, from the perspective of individual psychology, terrorists are not in the main suffering from serious psychopathology. They do not suffer from mental illness that could lead to the profound distortions of motivation and reality-testing one would expect to be associated with the
driven desire to carry out an act of mass destruction. At the same time, they suffer from psychosocial wounds that predispose them to seek affiliation with like-minded individuals. This strong affiliative need, coupled with an incomplete personal identity, provides the foundation for especially powerful group dynamics.

If this line of reasoning is correct, it suggests that the terrorist group is an unusually powerful setting for producing conforming behavior. Insofar as the individual psychosocial identity is incomplete or fragmented, the only way the member feels reasonably complete is in relation to the group. Belonging to the terrorist group for many becomes the most important component of their psychosocial identity. Indeed, data from terrorist memoirs and from interviews with terrorists suggest that individuals have a tendency to submerge their personal identity into a group identity. The fact that individual terrorists subordinate their own judgment to that of the group has major implications for the question of whether a terrorist group would engage in an act of nuclear terrorism.

A summary review of the evidence, direct and indirect, bearing on the group dynamics of political terrorism helps clarify this issue. The strong need to belong becomes a major lever for ensuring the compliance of group members. Andreas Baader, a founder of the Baader-Meinhof gang, used the threat of expulsion to ensure compliance. In response to members who expressed doubt about the group's violent tactics, he indicated that "whoever is in the group simply has to be tough, has to be able to hold out, and if one is not tough enough, there is not room for him here." Wanda Baeyer-Kaette, who had unusual access to members of the Heidelberg cell of the Red Army Faction, cites the example of a new recruit discussing an operation that had a high probability of producing a high casualty rate. When he questioned whether it was ideologically proper to conduct an operation where innocent blood would be shed, a heavy silence fell over the room. It quickly became apparent that to question the decision was to be seen as disloyal. Moreover, to question the group judgment was to risk losing his newly won place in the group.

The risks may be much more consequential than the mere loss of one's membership. Several conveyed the fear that to disagree actively with the group and be perceived as dissident was to risk not just membership but life itself. Baumann stated that withdrawal was impossible except "by way of the graveyard." Boock, a former Red Army Faction member, commented that the intensity of the pressures "can lead to things you can't imagine the fear of what is happening to one when you say, for example, 'No, I won't do that, and for these and these reasons.' What the consequences of that can be."

Thus there are great pressures for compliance and conformity that mute dissent. Consider the dilemma of the doubting group member, at once de-
sirous of belonging yet uncomfortable about an action that runs counter to his or her principles. For this person, ideological rhetoric plays an especially important role, providing the justification for the contemplated antisocial act. Indeed, as Baeyers-Kiette has noted, a remarkable upside-down logic characterizes terrorist group discussions. But there is a psycho-logic to the reasoning if one accepts the basic premise that what the group defines as good is desirable and what the group defines as bad is evil. If the group cause is served by a particular act, no matter how hemous, the act is good by definition.

Absolutist Rhetoric

The rhetoric of terrorism is absolutist, idealizing, and devaluing, polarizing “us versus them,” good versus evil. What is within the group is ideal and not to be questioned. What is without—the establishment—is the cause of society’s ills and is bad.

Throughout the broad spectrum of terrorist groups, no matter how diverse their causes, the absolutist rhetoric is remarkably similar. The absolutist rhetoric is characterized by splitting, an important psychological characteristic of the borderline personality, a personality disorder disproportionately represented in the terrorist population. Lorenz Bollinger, who has had the unusual opportunity of conducting in-depth psychoanalytic interviews of Red Army Faction terrorists, found a striking preponderance of borderline mechanisms, especially splitting and projecting onto the establishment the devalued aspects of the self while concomitantly idealizing the group. To the extent that the terrorist ideology devalues and dehumanizes the establishment and identifies it as the cause of society’s (the terrorists’) problems, it is not only not immoral to attempt to destroy the establishment, it is indeed the highest order of morality. By the terrorists’ upside-down logic, destroying the establishment is destroying the source of evil, and only good can result.

A brief excursion into indirect evidence is also in order. Studies of the membership of the Unification church of Reverend Sun Yung Moon are particularly instructive. They indicate that the more isolated and unaffiliated the individual was in terms of family and friends before joining, the more likely he or she was to find membership in the church attractive. And the greater was the emotional relief the new member found, the more likely he or she was to accept instruction to participate in antisocial acts. For the purposes of this comparison, recall the remarkable mass engagement ceremony in Madison Square Garden, where Reverend Moon assigned fiancés to 1,410 members. The individuals who found in the Unification church their entire self-definition were the individuals willing to accept blindly an assigned
marital partner, a step contrary to the social mores to which these individuals had been socialized.

A further major contribution to the power of the group over its members derives from the relationship between the group and its surrounding society. For the underground group isolated from society in particular, group cohesion develops in response to shared danger. In the words of a member of the Red Army Faction, group solidarity was "compelled exclusively by the illegal situation, fashioned into a common destiny."11 According to the testimony of another member, "the group was born under the pressure of pursuit" and that pressure was "the sole link holding the group together."12

Thus, the terrorist group represents an almost caricature version of the fight-flight group Bion described. The fight-flight group acts in opposition to the outside world, which both threatens and justifies its existence. The group perceives that the only way it can preserve itself is to fight against or flee from the enemy seeking to destroy it. This belief that the enemy is out to destroy it is not merely a paranoid delusion. Although initially it may derive from internal psychological assumptions, as a consequence of terrorist acts, the psychological assumption becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The terrorist group successfully creates an outside world that indeed is out to destroy it.

The psychological pressures within the individual terrorists and the psychological tensions within the group are externalized. Terrorist groups require enemies in order to cope with themselves. If such enemies do not exist, they create them, for if they cannot act against an outside enemy, they will tear themselves apart.

The evidence on terrorists thus indicates a pattern of behavior in which the predominant determinant of terrorist actions is the internal dynamics of the terrorist group. If the terrorist group does not achieve recognition as a feared opponent of the establishment, it loses its meaning. If the terrorist group does not commit acts of terrorism, it loses its meaning. A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism to justify its existence, and it needs to be recognized as a feared opponent in its fantasy war against society.

**Terrorist Decision Making**

If this characterization of terrorist group psychology is correct, what are the implications for group decision making? Would a group able to rationalize that its causes justify—indeed require—wreaking violence on innocent victims be similarly able to rationalize the mass destruction of nuclear terrorism? Is it a quantum leap, an unbridgeable gulf, or merely an incremental and inevitable step as terrorist acts escalate in magnitude? Can we construct a terrorist psychological that not only permits but requires nuclear terrorism?
In addressing this question, it is important to emphasize that more than most other decision-making groups, individual judgment in terrorist groups tends to be suspended and subordinated to the group process. Thus the focus of this inquiry is not whether individual terrorists could make such a catastrophic decision but whether a group deciding as a group could do so.

This approach requires us to address the phenomenon Jams identified as groupthink. Occurring when groups make decisions in times of crisis, it is defined as high cohesiveness and an accompanying concurrence-seeking tendency people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action, a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and normal judgment that results from in-group pressures.

Groupthink is characterized by the following features:

- Illusions of invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and excessive risk taking
- Collective rationalization efforts to dismiss challenges to key assumptions
- Presumption of the group’s morality
- Unidimensional perception of the enemy as evil (thereby denying the feasibility of negotiation) or incompetent (thereby justifying risky alternatives)
- Intolerance of challenges by a group member to shared key beliefs
- Unwillingness to express views that deviate from the perceived group consensus
- A shared illusion that unanimity is genuine
- The emergence of members who withhold adverse information concerning the instrumental and moral soundness of its decision from the group

This cluster of traits would seem to epitomize the decision making of the terrorist group. Of particular importance are the reduction of critical judgment, the assumption of the group’s morality, and the illusion of invulnerability leading to excessive risk taking.

Semel and Manix have investigated the effects of group dynamics on risk taking. In a group problem-solving task, they found that US Army groups shifted in the direction of riskier policy choices than individual members.
preferred privately. Individual tendencies were strongly reinforced and intensified as a result of interactions within the group. Also, the tendency of group members to conform to the preferences of the group was found to increase with the length of their interaction with the group.

The phenomena described by Janis and by Semmel and Minux occur with psychologically healthy mature adults. If mature adults with healthy self-esteem and appreciation of their own individuality can slip into such flawed decision making under the pressures of group dynamics, what of groups composed of individuals with weak self-esteem who depend on the group for their sense of significance? Does this circumstance not suggest that these groups would be subject to distorted decision making to a magnified degree?

Distorted decision making is not equivalent to total irrationality, however. Looking at the world through distorted lenses is not equivalent to being blind or being subject to visual hallucinations. Is there a psycho-logic that, under the pressure of distorted decision-making processes, could lead a terrorist group to opt for weapons of mass destruction? Jenkins has noted that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Mass casualties may not serve the terrorist goals and could alienate the population." But are there circumstances in which the upside-down logic of terrorists could lead them to want a lot of people dead, where they could be drawn to conclude that mass casualties could serve their goals and could do so without alienating the population? If there is a psycho-logic that could lead a group down that path, might not the distorted decision making make the difference in a close decision?

It is useful to invoke here a proposition advanced by Ariel Merari, who has made an important distinction between domestic terrorists acting on their own territory and those acting on the soil of other nations. Such groups as the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades believe they are in the vanguard of a social-revolutionary movement. They aspire to persuade their countrymen to join their fantasy war against the establishment, and they depend on their countrymen for both active and passive support. In attempting to draw attention to their cause through acts of terrorism, it is their countrymen they are trying to influence. The same is true for the terrorist group ETA when it is acting in the Basque region.

In vivid contrast, when a group operates across borders, the rules of the game in terms of the target of influence are quite different. As Merari has emphasized, when Palestinian terrorists operate in Israel, the horror and disapproval of the population in the target country are not a disincentive, they are a reward.

The issue of audience comes into play too. In the media age, each act has multiple audiences. If a group of moderate Palestinians, in considering a particular action, comes to believe that the act would invoke international opprobrium, that belief would mitigate against the action, for they much
value and need Western approval and would see the act as having the potential for being a setback to the Palestinian cause. In contrast, for radical Shiite terrorism, different weights are probably attached to the reactions of different sectors of the international audience. The degree to which the West is alienated by a particular act is probably not a major disincentive. The key point is that a group acting across borders is significantly less constrained than one operating within its own national boundaries. I believe it is with these groups that the greatest dangers lie.

The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism

An examination of the historical record provides some comfort. However, distorted their reasoning, their special psychological calculus, thus far terrorist groups have concluded that nuclear terrorism would not advance their cause and have rejected that option. Lest we draw false comfort from that historical record, however, let me suggest a scenario where a group might well have concluded that honor compelled it to perpetrate an act of mass violence and that such an act would advance its just cause. Indeed the scenario is not a product of fantasy but might have occurred had it not been for the alertness of the Israeli counterintelligence forces. In the spiraling cycle of violence begetting violence that characterizes the Middle East, an act of terrorism was planned and set into motion that, had it succeeded, would have had catastrophic consequences and could easily have provided a plausible rationale for nuclear terrorist response.

When we think of Middle East terrorists, we are prone to think of radical Palestinian groups or Shiite groups such as Amahl or Hizbollah. In this case, the terrorists were zealous Jewish fundamentalists—millenarian Kabbalists—who had formed a cell within Gush Emunim. Reasoning with a fundamentalist logic that has been analyzed by Ehud Springzak, an Israeli political scientist, they planned to destroy the two holiest Islamic mosques in Jerusalem—in fact, two of the holiest sites in the Islamic world—the El Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of Omar (the Dome of the Rock). Only the holy sites in Mecca and Medina are more important than the El Aksa Mosque, which is described in the Koran as the site at which Mohammed began his ninth journey. Built in 732 A.D., it has been the scene of violence in the past, for it was on its steps that King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan was assassinated in 1951, to be succeeded after a brief interregnum by his grandson King Hussein, who was at his side. Built in 1691, the Mosque of Omar is considered by many to be the most magnificent shrine in Jerusalem.

The logic of the Jewish terrorists is an example—and a horrifying one—of the psychological blinders that terrorists can wear, of the twisted psychological that can lead to actions that can shape history. In planning the destruc-
tion of the holy sites, these Jewish terrorists did not consider the holiness of the sites, nor did they define their planned action as an anti-Arab act. Nor did they dwell on the consequences in the Arab world to any significant degree. Their perspective was quite simple. The El Aksa Mosque stood on the temple mount, the holiest place in Judaism. The mosque was believed to stand on the very place where Abraham was instructed to sacrifice his son Isaac and was the site of the First Temple (built by Solomon in 970 B.C.) and of the Second Temple.

The millenarians believe that redemption and the coming of the messiah are due for the year 6000 (in the Jewish calendar). The Kabbalist millenarians feel that they can help these events occur, and if they do not, the coming of the Messiah may be postponed for another thousand years. This is why the Kabbalist band thought they had to help by removing the Muslim shrines, since according to their belief, the Messiah will rebuild the Jewish temple. For the fundamentalist Jewish terrorists, the planned destruction of the Islamic holy sites was necessary to restore the temple mount to its original form. Had they succeeded, there is little doubt that a jihad of worldwide proportions would have resulted. In that climate, nuclear terrorism against Israel would have been considered fully justified by many in the Islamic world.

There is another scenario worth considering—perhaps less extreme but potentially as far-reaching in its consequences. Is it beyond the pale to imagine a terrorist cell in West Germany, obsessed with an escalating arms race, persuading itself that the only way to avoid a nuclear holocaust would be forcibly to call attention to its humanitarian cause, and that the most effective way to do that would be to seize a nuclear weapon, not for the purpose of detonating it but as a means of capturing the world’s attention? Such an event could have profoundly destabilizing effects on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the politics of the NATO countries most concerned with the forward deployment of Pershing IIs.

In the two examples considered above, I have moved from considering terrorists’ actually detonating a nuclear device to their seizing a device in order to dramatize a cause. The next logical step in this progression is one that, from the point of view of the terrorist group, would involve even less profound consequences and hence would be more readily considered: the nuclear terrorist hoax. If it is technically feasible for a group with a certain range of scientific and engineering abilities to construct a primitive nuclear device, it is certainly much less complicated for it to mount a plausible hoax.

Although there have been a number of such episodes, it is puzzling that they have not been more frequent. A highly persuasive nuclear terrorist threat can have major consequences. The probability may be judged quite low, but were a group to provide plausible evidence that it had fissile material, could decision makers afford to ignore its demands? One of the major difficulties
with the low probability—high consequence act of high-technology terrorism is that it tends to throw normal procedures out the window. It is generally recommended that senior policy makers should avoid becoming involved in terrorist incidents. But should a plausible nuclear terrorism threat be raised, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for them to avoid becoming actively involved in dealing with the crisis. High-level involvement automatically changes the nature of the crisis and would in itself constitute success from the terrorists' perspective.

The possibility of nuclear terrorism is usually discounted because of the historical record and the logic that it would not serve the terrorists' goals. I believe it is highly likely that plausible nuclear hoaxes will occur with increasing frequency. It is a contingency that requires more active planning and preparation than it has been given.

One final class of actors must be considered: terrorist losers. Despite a stated commitment to various causes, the central priority for any terrorist group or organization is to survive. And surviving means committing acts that justify and call attention to its existence. What can be said of the terrorist group or faction on its way out, that has lost its support and its headlines, and, in a factional struggle, has lost its influence to a rival group? Desperate for success, might not such a group ask, "What have we got to lose?" Could the pressures of group decision making coupled with the requirement for organizational survival not argue for a nuclear spectacular as a way of regaining prominence? While the constraints raised earlier would continue to operate, in this case, I would suggest they would be significantly weakened.

**Summary**

To understand the psychological motivations and constraints of terrorists considering nuclear terrorism, it is necessary first to identify the important features of their individual, group and organizational psychology. Although there is no one terrorist mind-set, there is a pattern of psychosocial vulnerabilities that renders terrorists especially susceptible to the powerful influences of group and organizational dynamics. In particular, the act of joining a terrorist group represents for many an attempt to consolidate an incomplete psychosocial identity. A common feature is an unusually strong motivation to belong, coupled with a tendency to externalize, to blame the establishment for personal failures.

These characteristics set the stage for terrorist group members to be unusually susceptible to the forces of group dynamics. As a consequence, there is a tendency for individual judgment to be suspended so that conforming behavior results. Many of the features of "groupthink" are present, with its accompanying tendency toward risky decision making.
In considering the implications of these psychological understandings to the specific case of nuclear terrorism, it is emphasized that distorted decision making does not equate to totally irrational decision making. In certain circumstances, however, the distorted individual and group decision-making psychology could influence the group toward a high-risk option such as nuclear terrorism.

For terrorists operating within their own national boundaries, a terrorist act producing mass casualties would generally be counterproductive. For groups acting across national boundaries, however, this constraint does not apply to nearly the same degree. Although the opprobrium of the West will be a constraint for some, it will not be equally so for all terrorist groups. The degree of disincentive will relate in particular to the major audience of influence. Thus, Shiite fundamentalist terrorists would be less constrained than radical Palestinians, who would in turn be less constrained than more moderate Palestinian groups. Finally, there are the terrorist losers who are being shunted aside and losing the recognition they seek. Such a group could justify a terrorist spectacular in order to regain influence on the basis of a "what have we got to lose" rationale. Other scenarios are possible in which terrorist groups could conclude that an act of nuclear terrorism was required.

In thinking about the possibility of nuclear terrorism, it is important to distinguish between the actual detonation of a device and the use of a device for extortion and influence. The constraints against the latter are significantly reduced in contrast to acts producing mass casualties. The constraints are even more reduced in the case of the plausible nuclear hoax, an option that can be expected to become more frequent.

Notes

3 Jerrold Post, "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior," Terrorism, 7(3)(1984)
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
8 Psychoanalytic studies of individuals with "borderline" personalities reveal reliance on the primitive psychological mechanism of "splitting." Individuals who are narcissistically wounded in early childhood development do not develop a healthy
self concept. Unable to integrate the good and the bad aspects of themselves and their environment into a realistic whole, as children they split off the bad as the "not me," thereby maintaining a grandiose self concept.

9 Personal communication from L Bollinger, 1982


11 Ibid

12 Ibid


15 Ibid


17 Jenkins, "The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism"

18 A Merari, "A Classification of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism* 1(3-4) (1977) 331

19 Gush Emunim is a religious redemptionist Zionist group within Israel that has played a leading role in settling the West Bank and Gaza. It bases its political actions on Jewish religious sources.