UNDERSTANDING
JAPANS NUCLEAR TRANSPORTS:
THE
PLUTONIUM CONTEXT
Paul
Leventhal and Steven Dolley
Nuclear
Control Institute
Presented
to the Conference on
Carriage
of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Cargo by Sea:
Implications
and Responses
Maritime
Institute of Malaysia
Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia
October
18, 1999
Overview:
Japans Nuclear Power Program
and
the Sea Shipments Driven by It
We
are pleased to address this important conference on the troubling topic of Japans
sea shipments of nuclear materials.
Highly
radioactive reprocessing waste, vitrified in half-ton, steel-encased glass logs,
is also returned to Japan from France and Great Britain by sea.
The first such shipment took place in 1995, and there have been three
additional shipments since, one each year in 1997, 1998, and 1999.
More than 3,000 such canisters of vitrified nuclear waste are to be returned
to Japan. There were 28 canisters in the first shipment in 1996, 40 canisters
in the second shipment in 1997, 60 canisters in the 1998 shipment, and 40 canisters
in the 1999 shipment. Future shipments
will carry 150 canisters, and at least 15 to 30 shipments are likely over a
15-year period. Each shipment contains
more highly radioactive material than was released in the 1986 Chernobyl accident.
The
Plutonium Dream:
The
Rest of the World is Awakening from It,
But
Japan Dreams On
Japan,
ever since its decision in 1956 to acquire an indigenous reprocessing capability,
shared in this plutonium dream. The oil supply disruptions and price shocks
of the 1970s reinforced Japan's commitment to develop plutonium as the means
of assuring energy independence. However,
the world's plutonium dream began to fall apart in the 1970s as the underlying
assumptions began to fall away. High capital costs and safety concerns caused
many nations to scale back dramatically their nuclear-power development programs.
At the same time, uranium turned out to be far more abundant than anticipated.
After an abortive attempt by major suppliers to form a uranium cartel
in the 1970s, the price of this commodity began steadily to decline as the market
became oversupplied.
This
reversal of fortune for plutonium has been reflected in changes in the nuclear-power
programs of most major industrial states. The United States, the nation that
originally created the plutonium dream through its "Atoms for Peace"
program of the 1950s, put the brakes on plans for a domestic closed fuel cycle
in the 1970s, as a result of directives from Presidents Ford and Carter. The
rejection of plutonium recycle for the U.S. nuclear-power industry was formalized
by cancellation of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor and Barnwell reprocessing
plant projects in the early 1980s, during the Reagan Administration.
Beyond
economic realities, a primary force motivating these actions was growing concern
about the nuclear-proliferation and nuclear-terrorism risks of the plutonium
fuel cycle. This concern has been carried forward by the Clinton Administration,
which declared in its 1993 non- proliferation policy statement that "[t]he
United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium, and accordingly,
does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or
nuclear explosive purposes." Because of proliferation concerns, the Clinton
Administration halted work on the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor, a modified
breeder-reactor technology, in 1994.
Plutonium
advocates in Western Europe and Japan are quick to blame the anti-reprocessing
policy of the United States for their misfortunes, and do not like to acknowledge
what actually has happened to the plutonium industry over the last 20 years.
It is afflicted with a fatal condition, one with numerous causes.
The demise of the fast-breeder reactor (FBR), the original rationale
for closing the fuel cycle, was the first and primary etiology.
The
United States abandoned its FBR program in 1983 with the cancellation of the
Clinch River Breeder Reactor. Since
then, the major nuclear industrial nations have followed one by one, until today
only India, Russia and Japan still plan to develop FBRs.
Japans program is on hold after a near-catastrophic sodium leak
and fire crippled the experimental Monju FBR in December 1995. Construction
of a follow-on demonstration FBR was postponed indefinitely.
Russias economic crisis will block its FBR development program
for the foreseeable future. Indias
breeder is essentially a non-starter, and its May 1998 nuclear-bomb tests confirmed
what the world long suspected: its civilian plutonium facilities have been a
front and a source of material for its nuclear weapons program.
Japan, France and Russia still cling stubbornly to the FBR pipe dream,
and have begun discussions on how they can pursue cooperative breeder reactor
R&D.
Other
causes of this terminal disease include substantially diminished prospects for
future nuclear power capacity. A
quarter-century ago, President Gerald Fords Project Independence
energy policy anticipated that 1,000 commercial nuclear power plants would be
operating in the United States by the year 2000. One year short of that milestone, less than half that number
are operating in the entire world.
As a result, uranium resources and enrichment capacity are cheap and
abundant. The enormous capital
costs of plutonium fuel cycle facilities have proved to be a millstone around
the neck of the nuclear power industry, aggravated by the fact that plutonium-uranium,
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel is at least ten times more expensive than standard low-enriched
uranium fuel (LEU). Finally, there
is a grudging recognition of the safety and proliferation risks associated with
the plutonium fuel cycle.
Nevertheless,
Japan continues with its ambitious plutonium fuel cycle plans, but they are
set back by accidents, scandals and delays.
As noted, the FBR program was left in limbo by the 1995 Monju accident.
In addition, a fire and explosion contaminated 37 workers at the Tokai-mura
reprocessing plant in March 1997. Efforts
by investigators to cover up and doctor evidence from the Monju FBR and Tokai
reprocessing plant accidents led to the dismantlement of the state-run Power
Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC), which had been in charge
of FBR development in Japan.
The
accident began when workers were converting enriched uranium into oxide powder
for use in preparing fuel for the Joyo experimental fast breeder reactor.
This reactor is part of Japans plutonium-production program.
The uranium was enriched to 18.8% U-235, far higher than the 3 to 5%
enriched uranium used as fuel in Japans conventional nuclear power reactors.
Breeder fuel, whether enriched uranium or plutonium, is far more susceptible
to criticality accidents than power-reactor fuel.
At
one point, radiation levels near the plant were 15,000 times above normal background.
A total of at least 49 people were contaminated with radiation, including
39 JCO staff, seven residents, and three firefighters who transported the injured
workers. Two of the workers received such high doses of radiation that
they are not expected to survive.
In
further setbacks to the plutonium program, data used to certify Kansai Electrics
MOX fuel transportation cask was found to have been falsified, and the cask
is now undergoing relicensing. Also, BNFL recently acknowledged that it had
falsified quality-control data on MOX fuel pellets it was preparing for use
in a Japanese power reactor, and an investigation is now underway to determine
if there has been more extensive falsification of this key safety data.
Nations
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Peoples Republic of China have growing
nuclear power sectors, and could be influenced by Japans example in developing
policies for the back end of the fuel cycle.
Over the last several years, both South Korea and Taiwan have expressed
interest in exploring reprocessing and MOX options, and Cogema, BNFL, and Minatom
have aggressively sought their business despite U.S. opposition to the recovery
of plutonium from fuel originally supplied by the United States to South Korea
and Taiwan. China has begun construction
of a small reprocessing plant, which it hopes to complete by next year.
Nuclear utility and government officials in these candidate states should
be paying close attention to the plutonium quagmire that Europe and Japan now
find themselves in.
Japan's
plutonium program should therefore be assessed from an international perspective.
The environmental, public health, and nuclear-proliferation risks associated
with this program extend beyond Japans borders, making it a proper subject
for international concern despite Japans view that it is a purely domestic
question of Japanese energy policy. Besides
Germany, Japan is the single largest client of both the French and British state-controlled
plutonium industries. Starved of
new contracts, these industries would likely have to shut down. With Germany
now actively exploring alternatives to reprocessing, Japan is apparently prepared
to sustain single-handedly the British and French plutonium industries despite
the growing consensus that plutonium is unjustifiable from a commercial standpoint
and antithetical to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
Japans Plutonium Program Threatens Regional Stability
For
years, Japanese plutonium separation has been intended to guarantee plutonium
fuel for future breeder reactors. The 1992 plutonium shipment was claimed to
be urgently needed to fuel Japan's new Monju breeder reactor. Yet, when that
shipment was underway, it was announced that, in fact, the plutonium was only
to be held for future use. Actually, the 1.7 tons of plutonium delivered in
that shipment have never been used but remain stockpiled in Japan. Monju has
been shut down after the severe accident in 1995, and Japan has no serious plans
to construct a new breeder reactor. Now the in-country stockpile of weapons-usable
plutonium stands at over 5 metric tons---equivalent to at least 600 nuclear
weapons.
The
plutonium lobby is causing confusion over whether so-called reactor-grade
plutonium (which contains a higher proportion of the Pu-240 isotope than the
weapons-grade plutonium produced in the bomb programs of the nuclear
weapons states) can actually be used to make bombs.
In fact, that question was settled long ago. Nuclear-weapon designers from the United States, Great Britain
and Russia agree that bombs can be made from reactor-grade plutonium. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system treats virtually all isotopes
of plutonium as 'direct-use material,' suitable for bombs. Only the Japanese
plutonium industry claims otherwise, and it doesn't provide a shred of evidence
to contradict the weapons designers.
MOX
supporters have claimed that, even if reactor-grade plutonium could theoretically
be used in bombs, its higher levels of heat and spontaneous neutron generation
make it nearly impossible to develop effective, reliable weapons with large
explosive yields. However, the
U.S. Department of Energy concluded in its 1997 non-proliferation assessment
of MOX fuel that
At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferating state
or
subnational group using designs and technologies no more sophisticated
than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build
a nuclear
weapon from reactor-grade plutonium that would have an assured,
reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly
higher than that)....Proliferating states using designs of intermediate
sophistication could produce weapons with assured yields substantially
higher than the kiloton-range...In short, reactor-grade plutonium is
weapons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced
nuclear weapon states. Theft of separated plutonium, whether
weapons-grade or reactor-grade, would pose a grave security risk.
[3]
The ability to construct a weapon from reactor-grade plutonium was demonstrated
decades ago. It is dangerous even to consider it an open question. Hans Blix,
then director-general of the IAEA, informed the Nuclear Control Institute in
1991 that there is "no debate" on this point in the Safeguards Department
of the IAEA.
[4]
The
IAEA Department of Safeguards stated that "even highly burned reactor-grade
plutonium can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons capable of very
substantial explosive yields."
[5]
In June 1994, U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary declassified further
details of a 1962 test of a nuclear device using reactor-grade plutonium, which
successfully produced a nuclear yield.
Japan's
neighbors should not buy the industry's propaganda campaign.
They should be aware that the plutonium in the MOX-fuel shipments could
be used to make dozens of bombs. In light of this, Japan should carefully consider
the ominous signal that its plutonium program sends to its neighbors.
Despite
Japanese denials, nuclear-weapon experts unanimously agree that plutonium in
commercial forms can be used to construct nuclear weapons. In fact, for this
very reason, Japan does not want other countries to launch plutonium-use programs
which would lead to their possession of weapons-usable material. The spread
of plutonium programs would lead to a new and deadly phase of nuclear proliferation---one
which could make the new century far more dangerous than the one we have survived.
Japan has a clear choice: It can terminate its plutonium program and
assume leadership in the international drive to ban the production and use of
plutonium. Or it can be the driving
force for global plutonium commerce. The latter course is perilous both for
Japan and for the international community.
Japan
May Yet Choose to Exercise Its Nuclear-Weapons Option
Japan
insists that it has only peaceful intentions for its enormous and growing surplus
of separated plutonium. However,
the political situation faced by Japan is highly fluid and unstable.
Volatile relations between North and South Korea, the nuclear-armed stand-off
between a newly-elected coalition government in India and a new military junta
in Pakistan, and dedicated efforts by China to upgrade its nuclear arsenal all
factor into Japans defense equation.
These continued regional security threats could erode the nuclear
taboo that has prevented Japan from becoming a nuclear weapons state.
Recently, Professor Atsuyuki Suzuki of Tokyo University, a strong proponent
of Japans civilian plutonium program, suggested that Japans adherence
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be ensured if the
worlds nuclear weapons states treat Japan as a virtual nuclear weapons
state.
[6]
Morton Halperin, prior to assuming his current post
as director of the U.S. State Departments Policy Planning Staff, described
Japans threshold state status.
[J]apanese
governments have done what was politically possible to support U.S. nuclear
policy while quietly putting Japan into a position to be able to quickly develop
nuclear weapons and sophisticated missile delivery systems should a consensus
develop in Japan that this needed to be done. . . . Yet while [Japan] insists
that it is determined not to develop nuclear weapons, Japan has a peaceful nuclear
power program that generates weapons-grade plutonium, and it also has a space
exploration program; many believe that there are Japanese officials that know
exactly how to turn these activities into a program that produces nuclear weapons
mated to effective delivery systems, although there is disagreement about how
quickly Japan could have a truly functional nuclear force. . . . No one should
take for granted the Japanese commitment over the long run to refrain from developing
nuclear weapons.
[7]
Some leading Japanese politicians have begun to advocate
publicly that Japan become a nuclear-weapon state. In July, Shingo Nishimura, an LDP member of parliament, stated
that Japan must be like NATO countries.
We must have the military power and the legal authority to act on it.
We ought to have aircraft carriers, long-range missiles, long-range bombers.
We should even have the atomic bomb, though he conceded that Im
probably in the minority there.
[8]
The nuclear-weapon potential of Japans plutonium
program should not be ignored by its regional
neighbors, because there is no credible economic rationale for the enormous
plutonium surplus that Japan is accruing.
As security analyst Andrew Mack of Australian National University explained,
The
energy security argument which has provided the central justification for Japanese
involvement in the plutonium/fast breeder economy no longer seems compelling
to many outside observers. There
is currently a glut in the world uranium market and nothing to prevent
the Japanese from stockpiling uranium if energy security is a major concern.
. . . If the energy security and economic arguments for Japans involvement
in the plutonium economy are even less compelling today than ever before, then
it is hardly surprising if regional states should ask what other possible motives
Japan may have for creating so much plutonium.
[9]
It must be recognized that these concerns will become far more acute if
Japan proceeds with plans that will cause it to acquire over 100 tons of separated
plutonium by 2010, more than is now contained in the deployed weapons of the
nuclear superpowers.
The recently-concluded MOX fuel shipment
is the first plutonium shipment to Japan since 1992. Global concern about the safety and
security of the 1992 plutonium shipment caused an international outcry and led nations to condemn, and in some cases prohibit,
this transport from their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).
During the 1992 plutonium shipment, the
Japanese government sought to quell the controversy by promising to make details more
transparent and to keep the shipment more than 200 miles away from other nations coasts.
Those promises were not honored, and the shipment proceeded under circumstances of great
secrecy. There was no consultation with en route states regarding route and emergency
plans. That transport, as well as nuclear waste shipments since then, have sailed inside
EEZ waters of a number of countries.
The Japanese government, together with the
UK and France, are now replicating the mistakes
and magnifying the risks of the 1992 plutonium shipment. Despite repeated requests from
governments and non-governmental organizations, the Japanese government refused to conduct
an international environmental impact assessment of this plutonium shipment as required
under customary international law and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (articles
204, 205, 206). Nor have the Japanese, British and French governments met the legitimate
demands of dozens of potentially affected en-route nations for consultation and
concurrence on route, emergency, and salvage
plans, as well as issues related to liability and compensation.
The initial vitrified-waste shipment in
1995 of 28 containers sailed around South America's Cape Horn, through the Pacific to
Japan. Argentina, Brazil and Chile ordered the ship to remain outside their coastal
waters. Chile used a gunboat to force the ship to leave its 200-mile exclusive economic
zone. At a 1996 meeting of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), coastal nations along three potential routes of the nuclear
shipments raised legal and technical objections. Led by Argentina, they asked for a
binding code requiring prior notification of voyages, advance consultation on
emergency-response planning, a clear-cut liability regime, and a demonstrated ability to
salvage lost cargos.
Japan has yet to grant any of these
requests as they relate to its nuclear shipments. Yet,
Japan does not hesitate to act to protect its own environmental interests. The Japanese nuclear utility TEPCO ordered its own
MOX-fuel shipment back to sea just as it arrived last month, in case a typhoon that was
passing through were to damage the vessel and release its radioactive contents.[10] This
was an exercise of territorial sovereignty that Japan has refused to respect when en-route
states have requested that Japanese nuclear shipments stay out of their waters.
Earlier this month, the South Pacific
Forum protested the shipments, stating its view that shipments of radioactive
materials and Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel through the region posed a continuing
concern
[and] reiterated the expectation that such shipments should be carried out in
a manner which addressed all possible contingencies and the concerns of relevant
countries, including coastal states of the region.
Among the Forums expectations was that the shipper would compensate the
region for economic losses caused to tourism, fisheries and other industries affected as a
result of an accident involving a shipment of radioactive materials and MOX fuel even
if there is no actual environmental damage caused.[11] [emphasis added] Japan should now be sensitive to this appeal,
since Ibaraki prefectures tourism, fishing, and orchards were severely hurt
economically when people stayed away from the area as a result of the Tokai criticality
accident.[12]
Being Transferred to the High Seas?
The concerns of en-route nations are both
understandable and justified. Japans
plutonium safety record has been deplorable. As
noted earlier in this paper, a number of major accidents have occurred in the last several
years, including the Monju FBR sodium leak, the fire at the Tokai reprocessing plant, and
the criticality accident at the Tokai fuel plant.
Another initiative that poses a serious
accident risk is Japans ambitious program (the Plu-thermal program) to
use MOX fuel in its conventional light water reactors (LWRs). The MOX shipment that arrived in September was the
first batch of fuel destined for this program. One
ship contained eight fuel assemblies, intended for use in the Takahama No. 4 plant in
Fukui Prefecture, that were manufactured at BNFL's MOX Demonstration Facility (MDF) at
Sellafield. It was revealed in September, while the ships were still en route to Japan,
that employees at MDF violated quality control procedures by falsifying size data for at
least ten lots of MOX fuel pellets. Although BNFL claims that the MOX fuel in the current
shipment was not affected, this incident raises doubts about the credibility of its entire
quality control system. The quality of all the MOX fuel produced at MDF is therefore
subject to question.
The Japanese nuclear
industry dismisses severe accidents as having such a low probability of occurrence that
they are effectively impossible. In 1983,
JCO and its regulators concluded that a criticality accident at the Tokai fuel plant was
impossible---a posture quite similar to the one that applies to a breach- or
bypass-of-containment accident at light water reactors.
A recent study by Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI scientific director, concluded that the use
of MOX fuel in LWRs increases the consequences of such accidents and may increase the
probability as well. In particular, because
of the greater concentrations of toxic radioactive isotopes such as plutonium, americium
and curium in a light-water reactor operating with MOX fuel compared with one operating on
LEU fuel, the consequences for public health of a core-meltdown accident would be
significantly greater.
Plutonium and MOX Shipments
Physical protection is one of the most
important issues when weapon-usable nuclear material is being transported. Because of the inherent difficulties in protecting
material produced by the ton that can be used by the pound to make atomic bombs, the
International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism recommended that such
materials---separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium---should be given protection
in civil programs equivalent to government protection of weapons and that
extraordinary precautions should be taken to protect them from terrorists.[13]
Over a decade ago, Japanese nuclear
safeguards expert Hideo Kuroi correctly anticipated that, due to the complexity and
expense of security and safeguards, international transportation may be the
Achilles Heel of the Japanese nuclear industry.[14] Despite
this vulnerability, the physical protection requirements for each successive shipment of
plutonium to Japan have been ratcheted down even as the capabilities of international
terrorist organizations and of the states that support them have been ratcheting up.
In 1984, a shipment of 253 kilograms of
plutonium took place aboard a Japanese cargo vessel.
The U.S. Department of Energy has disclosed that the vessel was placed under
surveillance by military vessels, or maritime safety vessels, including U.S. vessels,
throughout the voyage. In 1992, 1.7 tons of
plutonium were shipped aboard a specially-outfitted British cargo vessel and escorted
throughout the voyage by a Japanese coast guard cutter, the Shikishima.
Yet in May, the U.S. State Department
bowed to Japanese demands that the then-pending MOX shipment---containing enough plutonium
for at least 60 nuclear weapons---not be escorted by the Shikishima. (The United
States has to approve Japanese plutonium transport security plans because the plutonium is
derived from U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel.) Richard J.K. Stratford, director of the State
Department Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs, wrote the Japanese government that a revised
plan---in which two British freighters would escort each other, armed with light cannon
and machine guns and manned with civilian guards---"fully satisfies" the
requirement for "adequate physical protection of the nuclear material." This
arrangement is expected to establish a precedent for dozens of larger MOX fuel shipments
to Japan now planned over the next 10 to 20 years involving more than 50 tons of
plutonium.
The revised security arrangement violates
Japanese obligations under the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The two
relatively slow and lightly armed freighters, manned with civilian guards from the UKAEA
Constabulary, are not capable of repelling an attack by terrorists or a nation determined
to hijack atom-bomb material. Under this security arrangement, both ships are carrying
plutonium and each therefore would be a target for seizure.
We now have reason to believe, based on a
legal analysis, that the Japanese and British governments misled the U.S. government by
stating that the PNTL vessels are "under government service."[15] There is no legal basis to the claim that
these commercial freighters are "under government service" to the United
Kingdom. Thus, Japan has failed to meet its security and transport obligations under the
terms of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
Given that the plutonium fuel contained in
this shipment is classified under international regulation as "direct-use"
nuclear weapons material, capable of being fashioned into a nuclear bomb in one to three weeks, the security lapses attending this shipment
were irresponsible and inexcusable. The 1992
shipment of plutonium involved a pure form rather than one mixed with uranium. Japan
has long insisted that the mixed-oxide fuel requires less security because it cannot be
used directly in nuclear weapons. However, in January 1997, the U.S. Department of Energy
declared in a nonproliferation assessment statement that "fresh MOX fuel remains a
material in the most sensitive safeguards category, because plutonium suitable for use in
weapons could be separated relatively quickly and easily." A year earlier, a
"Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report" by DOEs Sandia National
Laboratory estimated that in a matter of weeks a team of four people could separate
weapons-usable plutonium from fresh MOX fuel pellets and put it in a suitable form for use
in nuclear weapons.[16]
Of particular concern was the absence of
radar-directed anti-missile armaments on board the ships despite a 1988 assessment by the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that maritime transports of plutonium would be vulnerable to
"small, fast craft, especially if armed with anti-ship missiles."[17] The threat assessment on which the design
of the current security plan is based (the so-called "design basis threat")
assumes only an attack by terrorists rather than by an outlaw state or by terrorists
supported by such a state.
Wishful thinking, not the real world, is
the basis for these security arrangements. There
is also the desire by Japanese and European plutonium interests to keep down transport
costs and to keep up appearances of plutonium as a benign fuel. As noted, Japan's nuclear
power industry denies that plutonium produced and used in power reactors is an atom-bomb
material. With this kind of physical protection and public relations, commercial plutonium
could become a tempting target for terrorists and nations that want the bomb.
Nuclear Waste Shipments
Despite the fact that they do not contain
significant amounts of weapons-usable materials, the shipments of high-level nuclear waste
also pose major security concerns. In
February 1998, Greenpeace protesters managed to board the Pacific Swan as it passed
through the Panama Canal with its load of 60 high-level waste canisters.
Neither Panama Canal nor PNTL security
forces challenged the protesters as they approached the ship, boarded it, and chained
themselves to the mast. A Panama Canal
Commission (PCC) memo, obtained by Greenpeace International through a Freedom of
Information Act request, found that "communication, command and control...was
dysfunctional" when Greenpeace protesters easily boarded the nuclear-waste ship. The
report noted that patrol boats had failed to spot the Greenpeace launch and that the
ship's crew had thought the demonstrators to be security personnel boarding the ship.
Had the ship been boarded by a group of
well-armed attackers instead of peaceful demonstrators, its cargo would have been in grave
jeopardy, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the people of Panama. Given the
shippers' frequently professed concerns about security, we were astonished to discover how
thoroughly inept and ineffective were the security arrangements at the Panama Canal. In
fact, essential elements of the security system did not work.
Given the ineffectiveness of Canal
security as detailed in this report, a thorough evaluation of sabotage scenarios for
commercial vitrified-waste shipments is urgently needed. A January 1997 report by Sandia
National Laboratories describes a credible theft scenario.
In a two-stage attack, terrorists use a shaped charge to penetrate the cavity of a
VHLW shipping cask containing canisters of nuclear waste with imbedded warhead plutonium.
They then inject a low-explosive charge to blow off the lid of the cask to facilitate
theft of the undamaged canisters within.
The Sandia analysis, however, suggests a
credible sabotage scenario for commercial vitrified waste shipments by noting that
"excessive explosive charge size can rupture and deform" the waste canisters
within the cask.[18] The Sandia report did not analyze what
effect the injection of a high-explosive charge in the cask cavity would have. We believe
such a charge would cause serious damage to the radioactive contents and would likely
result in the expulsion of pulverized glass both in the form of respirable particles and
non-respirable fragments.
Such a two-stage attack utilizing high
explosives in the Panama Canal (or, for that matter, in the Strait of Malacca) could
result in both the sinking of the ship and the dispersal of deadly radioactive material
over a large area. The environmental and economic consequences of such an attack would be
catastrophic. We have requested that Sandia be directed to carry out this further study
before any additional high-level vitrified waste shipments are permitted to pass through
the Canal.
The severe risks of Japans sea
shipments are made all the more unacceptable by the fact that the shipments are entirely
unnecessary. Japan offers two justifications
for the plutonium program that drives these shipments: energy security and nuclear-waste
management. We will examine each rationale in
turn.
Japan does not need plutonium fuel or
breeder reactors for energy security
Advocates of plutonium recycling claim
that world uranium reserves will prove insufficient, perhaps facing total depletion within
a few decades. Such predictions are based on
the narrowest available estimates of total uranium reserves, that is, Reasonably
Assured Resources (RAR) recoverable at a cost below $80 per kilogram of uranium
oxide. However, RAR includes only well-known, completely explored deposits. If Estimated Additional Resources, Category I
(EAR-I)---known resources in deposits that have not been completely explored---are also
included, estimates of world reserves increase by more than half. Further, according to these OECD/IAEA estimates,
There remains very good potential for the discovery of additional uranium resources
of conventional type, as reflected by estimates of EAR-II and Speculative Resources.[19]
Even if Speculative Resources are
excluded, uranium reserves would suffice to fulfill projected world demand until the year
2062 from resources recoverable up to $80/kg of uranium oxide, or until the year 2075 from
resources recoverable up to $130/kg. Ample uranium exists to fulfill world demand far into
the future. Additionally, long before these
conventional uranium resources are depleted, rising prices would make uranium production
from unconventional sources, such as seawater, economically competitive, providing nearly
boundless uranium supplies without the need to resort to breeding plutonium.[20]
Even if Japan did not have confidence in
the continued abundance of uranium on the world market, it could stockpile a
strategic uranium reserve containing a 50 years supply of low-enriched
or natural uranium, for less than half the cost of its plutonium program.[21]
Japan Does Not Need Reprocessing or
Plutonium Fuel for Nuclear Waste Management
Reprocessing proponents also claim that
reprocessing and recycle represent a superior waste-management alternative to the direct
disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. They
cite the reduced volume of high-level waste when uranium and plutonium are recovered and
fission products are mixed in a glass matrix to create vitrified high level waste (VHLW). They also claim that the VHLW contains less toxic
and radioactive content than the equivalent amount of spent fuel.
First, to state the obvious: If plutonium
and recovered uranium from reprocessing are not recycled as MOX fuel, either in
LWRs or breeder reactors, no volume-reduction or toxicity-reduction benefits ensue,
because the plutonium and uranium must still be disposed of. In fact, uranium recovered from reprocessing is
not being widely used on a commercial basis, because it is far more expensive than
unirradiated uranium oxide, and also contains isotopes such as U-232 that complicate its
reuse and pose environmental safety and health risks.
Nor at this time is there widespread
recycle of plutonium, because of the high costs and risks, discussed earlier, that make
MOX fuel so unattractive to utilities and so threatening to the survival of the nuclear
power industry.
Even if the uranium and plutonium were
recycled, the irradiated MOX fuel must still be disposed of in a geologic repository. Plutonium advocates often imply, when addressing
non-technical audiences, that plutonium can be recycled in a closed fuel cycle until it is
entirely used up. However, such complete
burning of plutonium in MOX is impossible. After
only two or three recycles, the isotopics of plutonium are such that it cannot continue to
be re-irradiated in fresh MOX fuel, and must be disposed of.[22]
Moreover, even the most fervent MOX
supporters (France and Russia) do not currently plan to reprocess LWR MOX fuel even once
for recovery and re-use of plutonium.
Once
MOX fuel enters into the equation, any purported waste-management benefits
of reprocessing are forfeited. In
fact, in regard to volume and toxicity, irradiated MOX is considerably worse
than irradiated LEU for three reasons.
First, reprocessing itself creates substantial intermediate- and low-level
waste streams. When this waste
is taken into account, the volume of reprocessing waste products requiring
deep geological disposal is greater than the volume of waste from the equivalent
amount of once-through LEU fuel by at least a factor of ten.
[23]
Second,
the key variable determining the volume requirements for a geologic repository
is the total heat loading, not the physical volume of the spent fuel.
In this regard, MOX spent fuel creates much greater heat loading than
the comparable amount of LEU spent fuel, at least during the first hundred
years or so when heat loading is most significant.
[24]
Third, irradiated MOX fuel has considerably more radiotoxic content
than its LEU fuel equivalent.
[25]
It is worth noting (but it is not
surprising) that the only assessments claiming waste-management advantages for
reprocessing and recycle are those prepared by the plutonium industry itself. Independent studies invariably conclude either
that there would be no significant waste-management difference between the two cycles, or
that reprocessing-recycle would be worse than once-through/direct disposal.
Japanese utilities, which account for more
than half the foreign spent fuel at Sellafield, BNFLs reprocessing complex in Great
Britain, might welcome the opportunity to defer reprocessing of their spent fuel and
thereby avoid use of expensive, inefficient and controversial MOX fuel. Japan's breeder
reactor program is in limbo, prefectural officials are reluctant to approve the
introduction of MOX fuels in light-water reactors, and controversy continues unabated over
sea shipments of vitrified high-level waste and plutonium from Europe to Japan. Therefore,
an indefinite deferral of reprocessing makes good sense, especially since Japanese
utilities would be likely to be willing to pay substantial fees for storing spent fuel at
Sellafield in lieu of the costs of fabricating and using MOX fuel.
France and Great Britain should also
consider whether it will be feasible to return nuclear waste to Japan and other foreign
customers over the long term. The international community is likely to object strongly to
shipments of thousands of containers of hazardous nuclear waste that have no economic or
energy value, but which could have devastating health and environmental consequences in an
accident or act of sabotage. It may be preferable to store Japan's unreprocessed spent
fuel, or return it to Japan, rather than to store nuclear waste from reprocessing.
There
is still the question of what to do with Japanese plutonium already separated
from spent fuel. If COGEMA and
BNFL make it impossible for Japanese utilities to cancel impending reprocessing
contracts in favor of spent-fuel storage, Japanese utilities should request
that COGEMA and BNFL immobilize their separated plutonium in highly radioactive
waste. The plutonium could be mixed with ceramic or glass and placed in small
cans. These cans then would be placed inside canisters at the French R7T7
and British WVP waste-vitrification facilities. There, the canisters would
be filled with molten, vitrified high-level waste, locking the plutonium into
the equivalent of spent fuel with a self- protecting radiation barrier. This
approach, known as "can-in-canister," is currently under development
in the United States for disposition of at least a part of its stockpile of
surplus military plutonium.
[26]
[1]
Mark Hibbs, Too Late to Scuttle Rokkashomura Reprocessing
Plant, Utilities Claim, Nuclear Fuel, October 4, 1999, pp.
7-8.
[2]
Editorial,
Plutonium TransportationHow a Terrorist Looks At?, Atoms
in Japan, August 1999, p. 3.
[3]
U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Nonproliferation
and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and
Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007, January 1997,
pp. 38-39.
[4]
Blix
Says IAEA Does Not Dispute Utility of Reactor-Grade Pu for Weapons,
NuclearFuel, November 12, 1990.
[5]
T.E.
Shea and K. Chitumbo, Safeguarding Sensitive Nuclear Materials: Reinforced
Approaches, IAEA Bulletin, #3, 1993, p. 23.
[6]
A.
Suzuki, Quoted in Mark Hibbs, Tokyo Wont React to DPRK Threat
by Leaving NPT, Officials Assert, Nucleonics Week, August 12,
1999, p. 11.
[7]
Morton
Halperin, The Nuclear Dimensions of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Nautilus
Institute, July 9, 1999, pp. 15-16.
[8]
Shingo
Nishimura, quoted in Doug Struck, Japan Reluctantly Sharpening Its Sword,
Wall Street Journal, August 2, 1999, p. A13.
[9]
Andrew
Mack, Japan and Plutonium: Regional Security Implications, in
Asia-Pacific Forum on Sea Shipments of Japanese Plutonium: Issues and Concerns,
Nuclear Control Institute and Citizens Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo,
October 4-6, 1992, p. 24.
[10]
JapanPlutonium
Ship, Associated Press wire service, September 22, 1999.
[11]
Thirtieth
South Pacific Forum, Forum Communique, Koror, Republic of Palau,
3-5 October 1999, Article 30.
[12]
Mainichi
Shimbun, October 10, 1999.
[13]
Report
of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism,
in P. Leventhal and Y. Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report
and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism,
Lexington Books, 1987, pp. 17-19.
[14]
Hideo
Kuroi, Physical Protection Philosophy and Techniques in Japan,
Journal of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), January
1988, p. 31.
[15]
Eldon
V.C. Greenberg, MOX Transport/Use of Vessels On Government Service,
Legal Memorandum to the Nuclear Control Institute, September 29, 1999.
[16]
U.S.
DOE Nonproliferation Assessment, 1997, op cit, p. 85.
[17]
Department
of Defense report, quoted in Congressional Record, October 21, 1988,
p. E3602.
[18]
J.P.
Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, Sandia
National Laboratories, SAND97-8203 UC-700, October 1996, p. 4-14.
[19]
OECD-NEA/IAEA,
Uranium 1991: Resources, Production and Demand, 1992, Table 1, p. 21.
[20]
Toru
Hiraoka, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Nuclear Electricity
Generation Using Seawater Uranium, Atoms in Japan, December 1994,
pp. 14-16.
[21]
Paul
Leventhal and Steven Dolley, A Japanese Strategic Uranium Reserve: A
Safe and Economic Alternative to Plutonium, Science & Global
Security, 1994, Volume 5, pp. 1-31.
[22]
Report
by the Working Party on Physics of Plutonium Recycling, NEA Nuclear Science
Committee, Physics of Plutonium Recycling, Volume I: Issues and Perspectives,
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 1995, pp. 115-116.
[23]
Frank
von Hippel, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste Disposal,
Princeton University, January 1983, p. 3.
[24]
G.
Kessler et al., Direct Disposal Versus Multiple Recycling of Plutonium,
in Proceedings of the International Conference and Technology Exposition
on Future Nuclear Systems: Emerging Fuel Cycles and Waste Disposal Options:
Global 93, Seattle, Washington, September 12-17, 1993, pp. 277,
280.
[25]
U.S.
Office of Technology Assessment, Managing the Nations Commercial
High-Level Radioactive Waste, March 1985, p. 72.
[26]
Edwin
Lyman, Just Can It, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
November/December 1996.
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