Red Line
Nuclear Terrorism - How to Prevent it.Red Line
Nuclear Terrorism --- How To Prevent It
Direct address for this page is: www.nci.org/nuketerror.htm

 
  INDEX:
 
  Introduction
   Recent Developments  
/ links
  
Are Reactors Adequately Protected Against Attack?   / links / related news
  
Could Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?
   / links / related news
  
Would We Know if Fissile Materials Were Stolen?
   / links / related news
  
Are Nuclear Weapons Vulnerable to Theft?
   / links / related news
   How Vulnerable are Russian Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Reactors?   / links
   Are "Dirty Bombs" a Major Terrorism Risk?   / links / related news
  
The International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism
   / links
  
Key Studies Prepared for the Task Force
  
"Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat" - NCI book
   / links
  
Other Key Nuclear Terrorism Documents
   / links
  
Other Key Nuclear Terrorism Web Sites
  
What You Can Do
   Compilation of related News stories


  
 
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Introduction  

The attacks of September 11, 2001 have provided a wake-up call for facing the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Nuclear Control Institute, since its inception in 1981, has been analyzing the risks of nuclear terrorism and seeking to alert policymakers and the public to the danger. There was a solid basis for concern long before the attacks of September 11.

Quick Links to Key Documents
"Can Terrorists Build
   Nuclear Weapons?
"

(J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, Paper Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)

Nuclear Power Reactors are
  Inadequately Protected Against
  Terrorist Attack

(Testimony of Paul Leventhal, NCI President, on behalf of Nuclear Control Institute and Committee to Bridge the Gap before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, December 5, 2001)

Petition to the U.S. Nuclear
  Regulatory Commission

NCI/Hudson Riverkeeper Press Rel.
(NCI, Environmentalists and Elected Officials Call for Shutdown of Indian
Point Plant, November 8, 2001)

Press Conference on the
  Vulnerability of Nuclear
  Reactors to Terrorist Attack

(NCI and Committee to Bridge the Gap, National Press Club, Washington, DC, September 25, 2001)

"The Explosive Properties of
  Reactor-Grade Plutonium
"

(J. Carson Mark, Paper Prepared for Nuclear Control Institute, August 1990)

Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium
  Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?
(Marvin Miller, MIT, Paper Prepared for NCI, August 1990)

The NRC: What, Me Worry?
(Daniel Hirsch, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002)

Testimony of Paul Leventhal on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute on the Recommendations of the NRC Safeguards Performance Task Force
(Presented to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 5, 1999)

Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear
  Power Plants: A Moving Target Set

(Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, and Paul Leventhal, NCI President, Presented to the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), New Orleans, LA, July 2000)

"Severe Accidents and Terrorist
  Threats at Nuclear Reactors
"

(Gerald L. Pollack, Paper Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)

Report of the NCI/SUNY
  International Task Force on
  Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism

(June 25, 1986)

Iran threatened attacks against U.S. reactors as early as 1987. Trial testimony has revealed that Osama bin Ladens al Qaeda training camps offered instruction in urban warfare against enemies installations including power plants. It is prudent to assume, especially after the highly coordinated, surprise attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, that bin Ladens soldiers have done their homework and are fully capable of attacking nuclear plants for maximum effect. It is also clear that bin Laden was seeking nuclear explosive materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) and know-how for building atomic bombs, and other dangerous nuclear materials for use in "dirty bombs" to spread radioactive contamination with conventional high explosives.

In 1986, the Nuclear Control Institute, in cooperation with the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism of the State University of New York, convened the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, comprised of 26 nuclear scientists and industrialists, current and former government officials, and experts on terrorism from nine countries. The report issued by the Task Force, along with more than 20 commissioned studies, remains the most definitive examination of nuclear terrorism in the unclassified literature. (The report and a number of the studies are reproduced at the end of this section.)

The Task Force warned that the "probability of nuclear terrorism is increasing" because of a number of factors including "the growing incidence, sophistication and lethality of conventional forms of terrorism," as well as the vulnerability of nuclear power and research reactors to sabotage and of weapons-usable nuclear materials to theft. The Task Force's warnings and its recommendations for reducing vulnerabilities, many of which went unheeded, are all the more relevant in today's threat environment of sophisticated and suicidal terrorists dedicated to mass killing and destruction.


Recent Developments There is now intense national and international attention to the risks of nuclear terrorism. The possibilities that al Qaeda might acquire the materials and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons or "dirty bombs" or might attack commercial nuclear-power facilities to trigger a nuclear meltdown, are of particular concern. The Nuclear Control Institute has been alerting the public and policymakers to these risks, seeking emergency measures to reduce the vulnerabilites, and monitoring and assessing the responses of industry, governments and international agencies.

Click here for recent documents and developments, listed in reverse chronological order, relating to the threat of nuclear terrorism and the efforts to prevent it.


What follows are some of the key issues pertaining to the risks of nuclear terrorism:

Are reactors adequately protected against attack? For nearly 20 years, the Nuclear Control Institute has pressed the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to upgrade security at nuclear power plants. In 1994, we and the California-based Committee to Bridge the Gap finally succeeded in getting NRC to require nuclear-power plant operators to install defenses against truck bombs, although we remain concerned that these protective measures are inadequate to defend against the larger bombs used by terrorists since the 1993 truck-bomb attack against the World Trade Center.

Current NRC security regulations do not address the magnitude of threat demonstrated by the September 11 attacks. NRC standards require that nuclear plant operators protect against a much smaller number of attackers than involved in these attacks. Yet, even under the current weak standards, the armed guards at nearly half of the nuclear plants tested in NRC-supervised security exercises have failed to repel mock terrorist attacks or prevent simulated destruction of redundant safety systems that in real attacks could cause severe core damage, meltdown, and catastrophic radioactive releases.

This outcome is all the more worrisome because the NRCs mock terrorist exercises severely limit the tactics, weapons and explosives used by the adversary, do not test plant defenses against attacks from the air or from the water, and do not test whether guards could repel an attack on the spent-fuel pools at plant sites that contain many times more deadly radioactivity than the reactor cores. In addition, in response to industry complaints that the exercises are unfairly severe, the NRC is now preparing to shift responsibility for supervising the exercises to the plant operators themselves. Current events clearly demonstrate that nuclear power plant security is too important to be left to industry self-assessment or to the level of protection that industry is willing to pay for. The heightened security at nuclear plants since 9/11 still falls far short of the military-type protection we have recommended. The NRC is undertaking a "top to bottom" review of plant security with no indication of how long it will take to complete and implement or what additional measures will be required.

Despite nuclear industry claims to the contrary, it is highly unlikely that nuclear-power reactor containment domes are robust enough to withstand a direct hit from a jumbo jetliner. Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCIs scientific director, has calculated that a direct, high-speed hit by a large commercial passenger jet "would in fact have a high likelihood a penetrating a containment building" that houses a power reactor. "Following such an assault," Dr. Lyman said, "the possibility of an unmitigated loss-of-coolant accident and significant release of radiation into the environment is a very real one." Such a release, whether caused by an air strike, or by a ground or water assault, or by insider sabotage could result in tens of thousands of cancer deaths.

Click here for documents on the protection of nuclear reactors against attack.


Could terrorists build nuclear weapons? A study prepared for Nuclear Control Institute by five former U.S. nuclear weapons designers concluded that a sophisticated terrorist group would be capable of designing and building a workable nuclear bomb from stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium, with potential yields in the kiloton range. This risk must be taken seriously, particularly in light of documented attempts by al Qaeda to acquire nuclear material and nuclear-weapon design information. Despite claims to the contrary from plutonium-fuel advocates in the nuclear power industry, effective and devastating weapons could be made using "reactor-grade" plutonium, hundreds of tons of which are processed, stored and circulated around the world in civilian nuclear commerce.

Click here for documents that examine the ability of terrorists to construct nuclear weapons with materials now used in civilian nuclear commerce.


Would we know if fissile materials were stolen? Less than 18 pounds of plutonium or 55 pounds of highly enriched uranium are sufficient to make a nuclear bomb, but these materials circulate in civilian nuclear commerce by the ton. A crucial defense against nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation is to end civilian commerce in plutonium and highly enriched uranium and to convert military stocks of these nuclear explosives into non-weapon-usable forms as soon as possible. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency, a staunch promoter of nuclear power, has acknowledged an urgent need to improve protection of civilian and military nuclear materials at plant sites as well as in transit.

Nuclear Control Institute has long been a critic of the inability of IAEA inspections and other "safeguards" measures to detect large process losses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium or to ensure adequate protection against thefts of these materials in transit and in storage. IAEA physical-security standards now only apply to international shipments of nuclear materials, not to the facilities where these materials are processed, stored and used. Because of these shortcomings, we may not even know if materials that could be used in nuclear weapons is missing.

The vulnerabilities of Russian nuclear installations have been well documented, but protection of many Western facilities is also inadequate. Shortcomings in security of materials and warheads have even been documented in the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex. The situation in such emerging nuclear-weapon states as India and Pakistan is even more troubling. Contingency responses to theft and smuggling of materials or warheads must be further developed, and technical capabilities for finding and disarming terrorist bombs must be improved.

Click here for documents on nuclear safeguards and on physical protection of nuclear materials.


Are Nuclear Weapons Vulnerable to Theft? Although generally better secured than nuclear materials, there is still a possibility that nuclear weapons could be stolen by terrorists. In 1986, the NCI\SUNY International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism raised concerns about the vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons to theft. Since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia have removed nearly all their tactical nuclear weapons from overseas deployment. However, there has been continued speculation that some number of Soviet "suitcase bombs" (small portable nuclear weapons) remain unaccounted for, with unconfirmed reports that they have been obtained by al Qaeda. Also, security weaknesses have been identified at nuclear weapons laboratories and other installations in both Russia and the United States. Further, the security of India and Pakistans embryonic nuclear arsenals is uncertain, as is the question of whether weapons in these states are secured by Permissive Action Link (PAL) systems (coded, electronic locks). In the United States, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a highly secretive federal inter-agency group that has had the responsibility for more than 20 years for locating and deactivating terrorist nuclear weapons, but its technical ability to fulfill this daunting mission if the need arose remains uncertain.

Click here for documents examining the risk that terrorists could steal nuclear weapons.


How Vulnerable are Russian Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Reactors? Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the uncertain status of nuclear weapons, fissile materials and nuclear scientists in Russia and other former Soviet republics are widely regarded as posing perhaps the most immediate threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Despite significant assistance from the United States over the last ten years, many of Russias nuclear facilities seem poorly secured, and there is still no comprehensive, verifiable system of nuclear materials accountancy. No one even knows for certain how much nuclear weapons material the Soviet Union produced. With confirmed incidents of Russian-origin fissile materials turning up for sale on the black market, this danger is more than hypothetical.

Controversy also rages over how to dispose of plutonium recovered from dismantled Russian warheads. The Russian government and the Bush Administration plan to fabricate excess Russian and U.S. plutonium into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for irradiation in nuclear-power reactors (including Russias BN-600 prototype fast breeder reactor). However, a safer, less costly and more secure alternative would be to combine the plutonium with highly radioactive waste in molten glass. This immobilized plutonium, embedded in massive, highly radioactive glass blocks, could be directly disposed of in a geologic repository, and would prevent the circulation of tens of tons of plutonium in civilian commerce throughout Russia (as well as the United States) that
the MOX-fuel approach would necessitate. (More information on plutonium
disposition is available at www.nci.org/nci-wpu.htm)

NCI has supported U.S. assistance to secure Russias nuclear weapons, materials and facilities under the Defense Departments Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar) since its inception in 1991.  NCI has played a leading role in advocating the shutdown of Russias military plutonium production reactors, and has strongly and successfully opposed Russian proposals to convert these reactors to bomb-usable HEU fuel rather than closing them or converting to low-enriched uranium fuel.

Click here for documents on nuclear vulnerabilities in Russia.


Are "Dirty Bombs" a Major Terrorism Risk? "Dirty bombs," known also as radiation dispersal devices (RDDs), are weapons that use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials, thereby augmenting the injury and property damage caused by the explosion. The capability of an RDD to cause significant harm is strongly dependent on the type of radioactive material used and the means used to disperse it. Other important variables include location of the device and prevailing weather conditions.

Radioactive materials that could be employed in RDDs range from radiation sources used in medicine or industry to spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants. In general, the physical protection requirements for radioactive sources widely used in commerce are quite lax; however, the largest radiotherapy sources typically contain no more than a few hundred curies of gamma-emitters like cesium-137 or cobalt-60. Sources of this size, if removed from their shielded containers, could present an acute hazard to individuals within the vicinity (tens of meters) of the source. However, an effective dispersal of the material would tend to dilute the concentration downwind of the site of detonation to relatively low levels quickly. Acute radiation hazard would probably be confined to an area of a few hundred meters radius around the site for a ground-level release. However, the occurrence of localized areas of contamination further downwind would be a possibility, depending on the meteorology.

Standard modeling of these events in the midst of densely populated urban areas indicates no acute fatalities from radiation exposure and few cancer deaths. However, these models do not take into account the additional consequences that might occur from radioactive contamination of wounds suffered by people injured during the blast, which could cause additional internal contamination, or direct radiation exposure, which could impair the immune systems of burn victims and thwart their recovery.

The most concentrated sources of large quantities of radioactive isotopes are contained in spent nuclear fuel from power plants, but these sources are relatively inaccessible due to their size (several meters in height), weight (half a metric ton) and radiation barrier (thousands to tens of thousands of rem per hour surface dose). A single spent fuel assembly typically can be transported only in a shielded shipping cask weighing many tons. However, if such a package, usually containing radioactive inventories hundreds or thousands of times greater than those of the medical sources, could be acquired by terrorists or sabotaged during transport in an urban area, severe consequences could result, including thousands of latent cancer fatalities.

Click here for documents on dangers associated with "dirty bombs."


The International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism
(The report is described above.) The volume in which the report and associated studies were published is unfortunately out of print. Amazon.com or other used-book dealers may be able to find it for you.

Click here for the Task Force report.

Click here for selected studies commissioned by the Task Force.


"Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat" Studies from NCIs 1985 international conference that provided the basis and outlined the issues for the Task Force are published in this volume, now unfortunately out of print. Amazon.com or other used-book dealers may be able to find it for you.

Click here for table of contents.


Other key nuclear terrorism documents and web sites are catalogued to provide you with additional information and perspectives. (These resources do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Nuclear Control Institute.)

Click here for links to other documents on nuclear terrorism.

Click here for a list of nuclear terrorism web sites.


What you can do. A collection of e-mail addresses for U.S. and international policymakers is provided. Make your opinion known in order to make it count!

Click here to e-mail your opinions on nuclear terrorism to
federal and international policymakers.

 

  
   


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Recent Developments   

Nuclear Terrorism Experts Criticize NRC's 'Mini-Steps' on Reactor Security
   "Minimal Changes are Insufficient to Protect Against 9/11-Type Threats" 
(May 1, 2003)

No More Delays in Nuclear Plant Security Upgrades, NCI Tells NRC
(NCI Press Release, September 10, 2002)

Dr. Henry Kelly, President, Federation of American Scientists, Testimony
 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(March 6, 2002; PDF file 730kb)

Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear power plants and "dirty bombs", The threat of nuclear terrorism, The potential impact of a major nuclear attack, Security and prevention (British Medical Journal, Feb. 9, 2002; PDF file)

President Says Terrorists Had Diagrams Of Nuclear Power Plants;
   NRC Must Move Now On Major Upgrade Of Security Against Attack
(NCI Press Release , Jan. 30)
Nuclear plants targeted (Washington Times, Jan. 31)

NCI discloses that jet fighter crash test, as used by industry
  to show reactor containment survivability, is a phony

    Background  (NCI,  Jan. 27, 2002)

    Letter to Editor of NY Times  ( Jan. 27, 2002)
    NY Times editorial   (Jan. 21, 2002)
    Sandia National Laboratories disclaimer
    See: Jet Crash Photos / Jet Crash Video

Kallstrom Report Makes Clear Security Lapses At Indian Point And The Need To Shut Plant Down
    NCI Press Release (December 13, 2001)
    Kallstrom taunts terrorists: "Let 'em try!" (Associated Press Story, December 13, 2001)
    Kallstrom Report on Indian Point Security (December 12, 2001)

Nuclear Power Reactors are Inadequately Protected Against Terrorist Attack (Testimony of Paul Leventhal,
  NCI President, on behalf of Nuclear Control Institute and Committee to Bridge the Gap before the House
  Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, December 5, 2001)


DOE Agrees to Conduct Threat Assessment on Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipment from Japan to BNFL's Sellafield Site (DOE Letter to NCI and Greenpeace International, November 16, 2001)

U.S. Must Assess Security Threat Before Deciding on Shipment of Plutonium Fuel (MOX) from Japan to England  (NCI Press Release, November 14, 2001)

"What If Terror Went Nuclear?" (Letters to the Editor from Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, and Alan  Kuperman, NCI Senior Policy Analyst, New York Times, November 25, 2001)

Review of MOX Shipment from Japan to Great Britain
 (Letter from NCI and Greenpeace International to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, October 25, 2001)

A Summit Topic: Russia's Plutonium
 (Paul Leventhal, NCI President, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, November 13, 2001)


NY City Hall Press Conference: NCI, Environmentalists and Elected Officials Call for Shutdown of Indian Point Plant (November 8, 2001)
    NCI Press Release
    Petition to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    List of Petition Co-Signers
    Photos from the Press Conference
    Residents Near Indian Point Plant Question Evacuation Plans (New York Times, November 24, 2001)
    CBS "Eye on America" Report (November 8, 2001 / RealVideo)

IAEAs Acknowledgement of Nuclear Terrorism Risk is Welcome but Long Overdue
  (NCI Press Release, November 1, 2001)
    Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terrorism Threat (IAEA Press Release, November 1, 2001)


NCI Warns German Chancellor Schroeder of "Risk of Terrorism" at Bavaria's FRM-II Reactor
    NCI Press Release (October 29, 2001)
   
NCI Letter to German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (October 29, 2001)
   
Bavarian press release (October 25, 2001)

Representative Markey Calls Response to Nuclear Terrorism Threat "Inadequate and Irresponsible"
    Rep. Markey Press Release (October 16, 2001)
    Rep. Markey Letter to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve (September 14, 2001)
    NRC Response to Markey Letter (October 16, 2001)

Press Conference on the Vulnerability of Nuclear Reactors to Terrorist Attack
  (NCI and Committee to Bridge the Gap, National Press Club, Washington, DC, September 25, 2001)

    Transcript of NCI-CBG Press Conference, September 25, 2001 (PDF file)
    NCI-CBG Press Release, September 25, 2001
    NCI-CBG Letter to NRC Chairman Meserve, September 14, 2001
    Response from NRC Chairman Meserve, September 21, 2001 (GIF file)
    Statement by Daniel Hirsch, President, Committee to Bridge the Gap, September 25, 2001
    "Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Plant Containment Buildings to Penetration by Aircraft" (Abridged)
       (D. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, September 21, 2001)
    "NRC and Nuclear Industry Claims Regarding the Ability of Nuclear Plant Containments to
       Withstand Aircraft Crashes" (Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, September 24, 2001)
    Statement of Dr. Bennett Ramberg, Research Director, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Sept. 25, 2001
    "NRC Urges Increased Security" (NRC Press Release, September 11, 2001)
    "NRC Reacts to Terrorist Attacks" (NRC Press Release, September 21, 2001)
    "Publications & Documents on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism 1984-2001
       (Compiled by Sharon Tanzer, NCI Vice-President, and Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director)

 

 


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Are Reactors Adequately Protected Against Attack? 
  CLICK HERE for related news stories
Nuclear Terrorism Experts Criticize NRC's 'Mini-Steps' on Reactor Security
   "Minimal Changes are Insufficient to Protect Against 9/11-Type Threats" 
(May 1, 2003)

Science Article Inaccurate; Misrepresents Nuclear Terrorism Risks
    Statement by Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI President  (Sept. 20, 2002)

FBI Warning: Terrorists Plan Attacks On U.S. Nuclear Plants
CNN Moneyline Report & Interview: NCI President Paul Leventhal Debates NEI Vice-Pres. Ralph Beedle
      Transcript  /   Video  (CNN.com, January 31, 2002)
Nuclear Plants Possible Targets, Memo Warns  (CNN.com, February 1, 2002)
Text of NRC Notice to Plants about FBI Warning  (CNN.com)

NCI discloses that jet fighter crash test, as used by industry
  to show reactor containment survivability, is a phony
    Background  (NCI,  Jan. 27, 2002)

    Letter to Editor of NY Times  ( Jan. 27, 2002)
    NY Times editorial   (Jan. 21, 2002)
    Sandia National Laboratories disclaimer
    Crash photos & videos

Kallstrom Report Makes Clear Security Lapses At Indian Point And The Need To Shut Plant Down
    NCI Press Release (December 13, 2001)
    Kallstrom taunts terrorists: "Let 'em try!" (Associated Press Story, December 13, 2001)
    Kallstrom Report on Indian Point Security (December 12, 2001)

Nuclear Power Reactors are Inadequately Protected Against Terrorist Attack(Testimony of Paul Leventhal, NCI President, on behalf of Nuclear Control Institute and Committee to Bridge the Gap before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, December 5, 2001)

NY City Hall Press Conference:
  NCI, Environmentalists and Elected Officials Call for Shutdown of Indian Point Plant(November 8, 2001)

    NCI Press Release
    Petition to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    List of Petition Co-Signers
    Photos from the Press Conference
    Residents Near Indian Point Plant Question Evacuation Plans (New York Times, November 24, 2001)
    CBS "Eye on America" Report (November 8, 2001 / RealVideo)

Representative Markey Calls Response to Nuclear Terrorism Threat "Inadequate and Irresponsible"
    Rep. Markey Press Release (October 16, 2001)
    Rep. Markey Letter to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve (September 14, 2001)
    NRC Response to Markey Letter (October 16, 2001)

Press Conference on the Vulnerability of Nuclear Reactors to Terrorist Attack
  (NCI and Committee to Bridge the Gap, National Press Club, Washington, DC, September 25, 2001)

    Transcript of NCI-CBG Press Conference, September 25, 2001 (PDF file)
    NCI-CBG Press Release, September 25, 2001
    NCI-CBG Letter to NRC Chairman Meserve, September 14, 2001
    Response from NRC Chairman Meserve, September 21, 2001 (GIF file)
    Statement by Daniel Hirsch, President, Committee to Bridge the Gap, September 25, 2001
    "Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Plant Containment Buildings to Penetration by Aircraft" (Abridged)
       (D. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, September 21, 2001)
    "NRC and Nuclear Industry Claims Regarding the Ability of Nuclear Plant Containments to
       Withstand Aircraft Crashes" (Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, September 24, 2001)
    Statement of Dr. Bennett Ramberg, Research Director, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Sept. 25, 2001
    "NRC Urges Increased Security" (NRC Press Release, September 11, 2001)
    "NRC Reacts to Terrorist Attacks" (NRC Press Release, September 21, 2001)
    "Publications & Documents on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism 1984-2001
       (Compiled by Sharon Tanzer, NCI Vice-President, and Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director)

NCI Letter to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve, December 21, 2000

Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants: A Moving Target Set (Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, and Paul Leventhal, NCI President, Presented to the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), New Orleans, LA, July 2000)

Watchdog Groups Reveal NRC's Misguided Millenial Message to Reactor Operators: 'Don't Upgrade Defenses Against Terrorists'
    NCI-CBG Press Release (December 23, 1999)
    Letter from Paul Leventhal, NCI President, and Dan Hirsch, President, Committee to Bridge the Gap,
      to Richard Meserve, Chairman, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (December 23, 1999)

NCI Testifies on Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Plants to Terrorists
    Testimony of Paul Leventhal on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute on the Recommendations
      of the NRC Safeguards Performance Task Force, Presented to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
      Commission, May 5, 1999
    Transcript of NRC 5/5/99 Meeting on Safeguards Performance

NCI, Committee to Bridge the Gap Press NRC to Restore Nuclear Power Plant Security
Inspection Program (OSRE)
    Los Angeles Times (November 3, 1998)
    USA Today (November 3, 1998)
    Associated Press (November 10, 1998)
    Reuters (November 11, 1998)
    Los Angeles Times (November 15, 1998)

Concerns Voiced About NRC Truck-Bomb Regulations
    Letter to NRC Chair Shirley Jackson (on adequacy of regulations to protect against truck bombs,
      co-signed by NCI and Committee to Bridge the Gap, November 6, 1995)
    Reply from Shirley Jackson (December 20, 1995)
    Press Release on NRC Truck Bomb Rule (August 1, 1994)

"The Truck Bomb and Insider Threat to Nuclear Facilities" (Daniel Hirsch, Paper Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1987)

"Severe Accidents and Terrorist Threats at Nuclear Reactors"
  (Gerald L. Pollack, Paper Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1987)
 

 


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Could Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons? 
  CLICK HERE for related news stories

Nuclear Weapon Prepositioning as a Threat Strategy (by Stan Erickson July 2001)

Experts: No MAD in S. Asia Nuke War (AP, January 26, 2002)

"The Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium"
   (J. Carson Mark, Paper Prepared for Nuclear Control Institute, August 1990 / PDF format)

"Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?" (J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster,
   William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, Paper Prepared for the International Task Force
   on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1987)

 

 


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Would We Know if Fissile Materials Were Stolen? 
  CLICK HERE for related news stories

What If Terror Went Nuclear? (Letters to the Editor from Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, and Alan Kuperman, NCI Senior Policy Analyst, New York Times, November 25, 2001)

A Summit Topic: Russia's Plutonium
(Paul Leventhal, NCI President, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, November 13, 2001)

POGO Fact Sheet: Background on Security Failures at DOE Nuclear Weapons Facilities (January 2002)

Statement Of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Ma) Press Conference: Security At Doe Nuclear Sites
(January 23, 2002)

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk (POGO Report, October 15, 2001)

DOE Agrees to Conduct Threat Assessment on Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipment from Japan to BNFL's Sellafield Site (DOE Letter to NCI and Greenpeace International, November 16, 2001)

U.S. Must Assess Security Threat Before Deciding on Shipment of Plutonium Fuel (MOX) from Japan to England  (NCI Press Release, November 14, 2001)

Review of MOX Shipment from Japan to Great Britain  (Letter from NCI and Greenpeace International to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, October 25, 2001)

Highly-Enriched Uranium Seized in Czech Republic Reveals a Growing Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
(Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, NCI Issue Brief, December 22, 1994)

IAEA Safeguards Shortcomings: A Critique (Paul Leventhal, NCI President, September 12, 1994)

Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?
(Marvin Miller, MIT, Paper Prepared for NCI, August 1990)

Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception and Response in South Asia (Paul Leventhal, NCI President, and Brahma Chellaney, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard, paper presented to the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, October 10, 1988)

Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities (Herbert Dixon, Study Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)

The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to Nuclear Facilities (Daniel Hirsch, Study Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)

Clandestine Nuclear Trade and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism (Leonard Spector, Study Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986 / PDF file)

International Safeguards and Nuclear Terrorism (Sidney Moglewer, Study Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986 / PDF file)

European Nuclear Safeguards and Terrorism: A Personal Perspective (Enrico Jacchia, Study Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986 / PDF file)

 

 


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Are Nuclear Weapons Vulnerable to Theft?  
  CLICK HERE for related news stories
Defusing nuclear terror (by Jeffrey Richelson Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2002)

U.S. Fears Proliferation of 'Orphan Nukes (National Defense Magazine, February 2002)

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk
(Report by the Program on Government Oversight, October 15, 2001)

23rd Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapon Facilities -- Redacted Version (U.S. Department of Energy, March 1999)

Nuclear Weapons Security and Control (Thomas Julian, Study Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)

The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (Mahlon Gates, Study Prepared for the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)
 



 
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How Vulnerable are Russian Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Reactors?  

Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear
   Facilities and Military Forces
(National Intelligence Council, February 2002)

The Future of Immobilization Under the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement

(Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, Paper Presented at the 42nd Annual Meeting
of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Indian Wells, CA, July 18, 2001)

The Safety Risks of Using Mixed-Oxide Fuels in Russias VVER-1000 Reactors: An Overview
(Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, May 20, 2000)

     English Language Version
     Russian Language Version (PDF file)

HEU Core Conversion of Russian Production Reactors: A Major Threat to the International RERTR Regime
(Alan Kuperman and Paul Leventhal, NCI, Paper presented at the 21st Annual International RERTR Meeting, Sao Paulo, Brazil, October 19, 1998)


Letter from NCI  to Vice Pres. Al Gore, Opposing Conversion of Russian Production Reactors to HEU Fuel
(December 17, 1999)

Letter from NCI and Seven other Public-Interest Groups to Vice President Al Gore, Opposing Conversion of Russian Production Reactors to HEU Fuel (November 19, 1998)

Highly-Enriched Uranium Seized in Czech Republic Reveals a Growing Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
(Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, NCI Issue Brief, December 22, 1994)

Securing Plutonium and HEU - What Should We Be Doing After September 11th?
(Matthew Bunn, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard, December 10, 2001)

New Steps to Secure Nuclear Material in the Bush Administration (Matthew Bunn, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard, Presentation to Global 2001Conference, Paris, France. Sep. 9-13, 2001)

Renewing the Partnership: One Year Later (Matthew Bunn, Oleg Bukharin and Kenneth Luongo, Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, 2001)

The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material
(Matthew Bunn, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard, March 2000)


A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia (Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler, et al., Russia Task Force, Report to the Sec. of Energys Advisory Board, U.S. DOE, Jan. 10, 2001)
    Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Nonproliferation, and Federal Services, 
       U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
(Leonard Spector, Monterey Institute, Nov. 14, 2001)
    Toward a New Security Framework (Sen. Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
       Woodrow Wilson Center, October 3, 2001)


Options for Increased U.S.-Russian Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation and Projected Costs
(Kenneth Luongo, Executive Director, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, Oct. 2001)


Nuclear Power in Russia (World Nuclear Association, September 2001)

Improving U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cooperation
(Kenneth Luongo, RANSAC, Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 2001)


Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia
(Seigfried Hecker, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001)


Missing the Forest for the Trees: U.S. Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia
(Leonard Spector, Monterey Institute, Arms Control Today, June 2001)


Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union (Jon Wolfsthal et al., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2001)

The Way Forward for U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation
(Fred Wehling, Monterey Institute, April 2001)


Russias Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation
(Valentin Tikhonov, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2001)


Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed (General Accounting Office Report, February 2001 / PDF file)

Russia Overview (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2001)

Cooperative Efforts to Secure Fissile Material in the NIS
(Emily Ewell Daughtry & Fred Wehling, Monterey Institute, Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2000 / PDF)

Note: For documents marked with "PDF file" you need Adobe Acrobat PDF reader. Download is free.
 

 


  TOP  NEXT
Are "Dirty Bombs" a Major Terrorism Risk?  
  CLICK HERE for related news stories
Dr. Henry Kelly, President, Federation of American Scientists, Testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(March 6, 2002; PDF file 730kb)

"A Critique of Physical Protection Standards for Irradiated Materials"
(Edwin S. Lyman, Scientific Director, Nuclear Control Institute, presented at the 40th Annual
Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, AZ, July 1999)


Exploring the Unthinkable: Nuclear Fallout
(WebMD Live, November 12, 2001, By Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, Chat Transcript)
 

 



  TOP  NEXT
The International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism 
Report of the International Task Force
on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism
Key Studies Prepared for the Task Force

Content:

Acknowledgements
Statement of the
  Co-Chairman

Foreword
The Task Force Report
   Defining the Threat
   Establishing Priorities
   Task Force Recommendations
      Short-Term Recommendations
         Protecting Nuclear Weapons
         Protecting Nuclear Material
         Protecting Nuclear Facilities
         Intelligence Programs
         Civil Liberties Concerns
         Controlling Nuclear Transports
         U.S.-Soviet Cooperation
         Arms Control Initiatives
         Convention on Physical Protection
         Strengthening Emergency Management
         Role of the Media
      Long-Term Recommendations
         International Measures
         Emerging Nuclear Technologies
Appendix: For Further Consideration
   Production on Nuclear Materials
Biographies of the Task Force Members
Glossary

 

"Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?"
   (J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster,
   William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, Paper
   Prepared for the International Task Force on
   the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)

"Severe Accidents and Terrorist Threats at
    Nuclear Reactors
" (Gerald L. Pollack, Paper
    Prepared for the International Task Force
    on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 1986)
   

Selected chapters from the NCI book
"Preventing Nuclear Terrorism":

Clandestine Nuclear Trade and the Threat
   of Nuclear Terrorism
/ PDF (Leonard Spector)
Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism:
   Psychological Motivations and Constraints
/ PDF
   (Jerrold Post)

Nuclear Weapons Security and Control / PDF
   (Thomas Julian)
Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities / PDF
   (Herbert Dixon)
The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to
   Nuclear Facilities
/ PDF (Daniel Hirsch)
International Safeguards and Nuclear
  Terrorism
/ PDF (Sidney Moglewer)
European Nuclear Safeguards and Terrorism:
  A Personal Perspective
/ PDF (Enrico Jacchia)
Intelligence and the Prevention of Nuclear
  Terrorism
/ PDF (John Despres)
Mobilizing Intelligence Against Nuclear
  Terrorism: A Personal Perspective
/ PDF
  (Yuval Ne'eman)
U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Countering
  Nuclear Terrorism: The Role of Risk
  Reduction Centers
/ PDF
  (Sam Nunn & John Warner)

The Nuclear Emergency Search Team
/ PDF
  (Mahlon Gates)
Civil Liberties and Nuclear Terrorism
/ PDF
 
(Steven Goldberg)
About the Task Force Members &
Authors
 


View whole report in one PDF file (3 MB).

View above chapters in one PDF file (5 MB).
  Note: Selected book chapters above are posted in PDF format. If you do not have
the Adobe Acrobat viewer Click Here to download free viewer software.
We recommend downloading PDF files for printing purposes.

 
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

The Report and Papers of the
International Task Force on
Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism

Edited by:
Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander

A Nuclear Control Institute Book
in cooperation with the Institute for
Studies in International Terrorism,
State University of New York

Lexington Books
D.C Heath and Company/Lexington,
Massachusetts/Toronto




The book is now unfortunately out of print,
but Amazon.com or other used-book
dealers may be able to find it for you.

 

 



  TOP  NEXT
"Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat" - NCI book 

 

CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION
Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander                       1

RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY
Robert L. Beckman                                        5

Chapter One. Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?

Brian M. Jenkins                                        25
Responses by:
David Mabry                                             33
Yuval Ne'eman                                           35
Mason Willrich                                          37
John Peter Goss                                         39
Bertram Brown                                           43
Louis Rene Beres                                        45

Chapter Two. What Nuclear Means and Targets
Might Terrorists Find Attractive?

Thomas D. Davies                                        54
Responses by:
Merrill Walters                                         67
Guenter Hildenbrand                                     70
Theodore B. Taylor                                      78
William J. Dircks                                       79
D. A. V. Fischer                                        84
Peter Stockton                                          89

Chapter Three. How Can Government
and Industry Effectively Respond? 

Louis 0. Giuffrida                                      92
Responses by:
James K. Asselstine                                     99
Donald Devito                                          102
Jacques Meurant                                        105
Steven Goldberg                                        118
Andre Kleinman                                         121

Chapter Four. How Can Nuclear Violence Be Prevented?

Bernard O'Keefe                                        124
Responses by:
Harold Agnew                                           128
William 0. Doub                                        131
Bernard T. Feld                                        138
Paul Warnke                                            139
Amiram Nir                                             141

Chapter Five. Two Congressional Perspectives

Richard A. Gephardt and Jeremiah Denton                144
Appendix A. World Inventories of Plutonium            
David Albright                                         159
Appendix B. U.S. Exports of Highly Enriched Uranium   
David Albright                                         193
Appendix C. World Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants       199
Appendix D. The World Enrichment Picture               205
Selected Bibliography                                  209 

About the Editors and Contributors                     213

   

 
 

Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat

Edited by
Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander

The Nuclear Control Institute and
The State University of New York
Institute on Studies in International
Terrorism

Published with the cooperation of
The W. Alton Jones Foundation
PERGAMON-BRASSEY'S
International Defense Publishers Inc.

Washington New York London
Oxford Beijing Frankfurt Sao Paulo
Sydney Tokyo Toronto
 



The book is now unfortunately out of print,
but Amazon.com or other used-book
dealers may be able to find it for you.
 

 


  TOP  NEXT
Other Key Nuclear Terrorism Documents 

Nuclear Power Plant Guards Continue to Raise Concerns  Program on Government Oversight (POGO), September 30, 2002 www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020904-nukepower.html

"Suitcase Nukes": A Reassessment

Nikolai Sokov & William Potter, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, Sep
. 23, 2002

"Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation,"
a meeting of the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group.

Nuclear Terrorism & Health Effects  Centers for Disease Control, September 13, 2002
www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/q&a.htm

Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices from Inside the Fences  Program on Government Oversight (POGO), September 12, 2002 www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020901-nukepower.html

Markey Report on Security at DOE Nuclear Weapons Facilities, Augsut 20, 2002
Rep. Ed Markey, August 20, 2002

GAO Report: "U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning," 26 June 2002 (pdf)

"The Sum of All Nuclear Fears," Carnegie Proliferation Brief, Volume 5, Number 10, 30 May 2002

"Securing Nuclear Weapons and Material: Seven Steps for Immediate Action," by Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren and Anthony Wier, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2002 (pdf)

"Closing the Gaps," by Robert L. Civiak, Federation of American Scientists, May 2002

"Would They If They Could?"
by Gary Ackerman & Laura Snyder, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/ June 2002

"Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control In Russia,"

by Jon Wolfsthal and Tom Collina, Arms Control Today, April 2002.

Does Al Qaeda Have Nuclear Materials? Doubtful, But

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Activity from the CIA's biannual "Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions" report to Congress, January-June 2001. Released January 2002.

"Bin Laden and the Bomb," by David Albright, Kathryn Buehler, and Holly Higgins. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002.

Loose Nukes  Council on Foreign Relations, 2002
www.terrorismanswers.com/weapons/loosenukes_print.html

President's Plan to Strengthen Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, February 4, 2002)

Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation (President George Bush, February 2002 / PDF file)

Afghanistan's Army: The Ambiguities of National Defense
(Emily Clark, Center for Defense Information, February 4, 2002)

The Immutable Zero-sum Nature of the Indo-Pak Rivalry Ehsan AHRARI
(Nautilus Institute, January 23, 2002)

US Nuclear Weapons Policy After September 11th David Krieger
(Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Jan. 2002)

Action Update: Weekly War Reports
(Center for Defense Information, January 2002)

The Threat of Terrorism: U.S. Policy After September 11
(Several articles in International Security, Winter 2001/2002)

The NRC: What, Me Worry?
(Daniel Hirsch, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002)

Weapons of Mass Destruction in India and Pakistan
(Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 27, 2001)

Nuclear Terrorism  (Col. P.K. Gautam (ret.), Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, New Delhi, Dec. 10, 2001) 


Nuclear Terrorism  (Francis Calogero, Pugwash Council, December 7, 2001)

Nuclear Terrorism: A New Kind of War  (Jennifer Newsom, U. Texas-Austin, December 5, 2001)

Secrets, What Secrets?  Terrorists Might Exploit Pakistans Cavalier Attitude Toward Nuclear Information
(David Albright, ISIS, Scientific American, December 2001)

Nuclear Terrorism  (Sarah Estabrooks, Ploughshares Monitor, December 2001)


Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Patterns of Power  (International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2001)

Countering Nuclear Risks In South Asia
(Samina Ahmed, Council for a Livable World Education Fund Report, December 2001)

Beyond the Nuclear Dimension: Forging Stability in South Asia
(Sumit Ganguly, University of Texas, Arms Control Today, December 2001)

U.S. Offers Nuclear Security Assistance to Pakistan  (Arms Control Today, December 2001)

Uncovered Nukes: A Fact Sheet on Tactical Nuclear Weapons
(Alistair Millar and Brian Alexander, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger, November 30, 2001)

Global Q&A: Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Matthew Bunn, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, November 27, 2001)


International Nuclear Terrorism  (Columbia University International Affairs Online, November 19, 2001)

We Must Act As If He Has the Bomb [bin Laden]
(Graham Allison, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, Washington Post, November 18, 2001)


The Dangers of Nuclear Terrorism  (Pugwash Council, November 12, 2001)

Nuclear Terrorism: Relevance and Prospects in South Asia
(S. Gopal, South Asia Analysis Group, India, November 10, 2001)


Walk Softly in Nuclear South Asia (Zia Mian, Princeton University, November 9, 2001)

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism
(Report of a Panel Discussion, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, New Delhi, November 9, 2001)


Nuclear Terrorism: Potential Threats in the Post Cold War World
(Dr. Rajesh Kumar Mishra, South Asia Analysis Group, India, November 5, 2001)


Could the Worst Be Yet to Come?
[al Qaida & WMD]  (Graham Allison, Harvard, The Economist, November 1, 2001)

Recommendations for Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
(Frank von Hippel, Princeton, FAS Report, November 2001)

U.S. Denies Talks with Pakistan on Nuclear Security  (Arms Control Today, November 2001)

Guarding Nuclear Reactors and Material From Terrorists and Thieves
(George Bunn and Lyudmila Zaitseva, IAEA International Symposium, November 2001 / PDF file)

The Future of Nuclear Energy in an Era of Environmental & Terrorist Challenge
(John Ritch III, World Nuclear Association, November 2001)

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage (George Bunn and Matthew Bunn, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, presented at the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, Austria, October 30, 2001)

The U.S. and Pakistan: Allies, But No PALS  (Council for a Livable World, October 30, 2001)

Airliner Crash on Nuclear Facilities: The Sellafield Case (WISE-Paris, October 29, 2001 / PDF file)

Vulnerability of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants to Terrorist Attack and Internal Sabotage
(Jaya Tiwari, Physicians for Social Responsibility, October 2001)

Implications of the Afghan Crisis on South Asia (Henry Stimson Center, October 17, 2001)

U.S. Needs A Contingency Plan For Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal
(Jon Wolfsthal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2001)

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk
(Report by the Program on Government Oversight, October 15, 2001)

The U.S. and South Asia: New Priorities, Familiar Interests
(Teresita Schaffer, Center for War, Peace and the News Media, NYU, October 9, 2001)

Kashmir, the War on Terrorism, and Nonproliferation in South Asia
(Council for a Livable World Education, Fund, October 4, 2001)


Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex
(David Albright, Institute for Science in International Security, October 2001)


America's Terrorist Nuclear Threat to Itself
(Harvey Wasserman, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, October 2001)

Guarding Nuclear Reactors and Materials from Terrorists and Thieves
(George Bunn and Fritz Steinhausler, Arms Control Today, October 2001)

What if the Terrorists Go Nuclear?
(Bruce Blair, Terrorism Project, Center for Defense Information, October 1, 2001)

Nuclear Weapons and Homeland Security  (David Krieger, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, October 2001) 

Time to Shut Down the Nation's Nuclear Plants
(Mark Gaffney, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, October 2001)

Militarism and Arms Races: Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Policies
(Joseph Rotblat, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Fall 2001)

Defending America: Terrorist Organisations and States and Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 24 September 24, 2001)

Fuel for the Fire: Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism (Alastair Miller, Nautilus Institute, Sept. 28, 2001)

Roundtable on the Implications of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks for Nonproliferation and Arms Control  (Monterey Institute, September 28, 2001)

La Hague Particularly Exposed to Plane Crash Risk (WISE-Paris, September 26, 2001 / PDF file)

The September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storing and Security Aspects of TNWs
[Tactical Nuclear Weapons]  (Joshua Handler, Princeton University, September 24, 2001)

WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden  ( Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies Report, Monterey Institute for International Studies, September 2001)

"War on Terrorism": Implications for Asia
(Ralph Cossa, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 17, 2001) 

Nuclear Terrorism: The Unthinkable Nightmare  (David Albright et al., ISIS, September 13, 2001)

Nuclear Reactor Security  (David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists, September 2001)

Preventing a Terrorist Mushroom Cloud  (David Krieger, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, September 2001)

America's Worst Nightmare? Osama Bin Laden and Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Adam Dolnik, PIR Center for Policy Studies, September 12, 2001)

Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the New Great Game
(Eshan Ahrari, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 2001)

Beyond Missile Defense: Countering Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution, August 2001)

India-Pakistan Nuclear Parity: Is It Feasible or Necessary?
(P.K. Ghosh, Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis, New Delhi, India, Strategic Analysis, July 2001)

The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia
(Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., Henry Stimson Center, June 2001)

South Asian Nuclear, Missile & CBW Bibliography (Mark Gorwitz, University of Illinois, May 30, 2001)

U.S. and Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Forgotten Threat
(Jaya Tiwari, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 2001)

Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Strategy
(Frank Cilluffo et al., Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2000)

Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism Convention  (United Nations Documentation of Negotiations,
1996-1998, compiled by Federation of American Scientists)


Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures (Hearings before the House Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, October 1, 1997)

The Nuclear Terrorism Threat  (Kevin O'Neill, Institute for Science in International Security, August 1997)


Nuclear Terrorism  (John Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, March 20, 1996)

How to Avoid Nuclear Terrorism Against the U.S.: Preventing the Blood-Dimmed Tide.
(Louis Beres, Strategic Review, Volume 24, Spring 1996)


Holy Terror: Religious Terrorism (Dr. Bruce Hoffman. RAND Corporation)

 

 


  TOP  NEXT
Other Key Nuclear Terrorism Web Sites 

Arms Control Association -- "India and Pakistan: Documents, News and Analysis"

Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard -- "Nuclear Terrorism"

Brookings Institution -- "America's Response to Terrorism"

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace -- "Terrorism Resources"

Center for Defense Information -- "Terrorism Project"

Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute -- "Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism"

Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute -- "Terrorism"

Council for a Livable World -- "War Against Terrorism"

Federation of American Scientists -- "America's War on Terrorism"

Heritage Foundation -- "The War Against International Terrorism"

ISIS (Institute for Science in International Security) -- "Nuclear Terrorism"

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) -- "Combating Nuclear Terrorism"

IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) -- "The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism"

Nautilus Institute -- "Special Forum on the September 11 Attacks"

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation -- "Perspectives on Terrorist Attacks and the War in Afghanistan"

Office of Homeland Security

Program on Government Oversight


Rep. Edward J. Markey -- Anti-Terrorism Website

Terrorism: Questions & Answers Council on Foreign Relations

Terrorism Library 

Terrorism Research Center, Inc.

Three Mile Island Alert -- "Sabotage Threat at Nuclear Power Plants"


WISE Nuclear Safety and Terrorism

WISE-Paris

 

 


  TOP
What You Can Do 


  Express your concerns about nuclear terrorism to
  these U.S. officials and federal agencies.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
International Atomic Energy Agency
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
President George Bush
Vice President Richard Cheney
Governor Tom Ridge, Office of Homeland Security
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community)

 


 
  TOP
(Newsclips below will soon be organized under appropriate sections above.)


July 25   

Flight near Maine Yankee raises security concerns Boston Globe reacs
Border cargo being scanned for 'dirty bombs' Houston Chronicle DB
Four Jailed for Stealing Radioactive Material in Sichuan Beijing Time fismat

July 24   
House Passes Anti-Terrorism Package AP recdev
Rumsfeld Urges Consideration of Pre-Emptive Action Global Security
Newswire NT recdev
House approves $28.9B anti-terror package
USA Today recdev
FEMA's Influence May Be Cut Under New Department Washington Post recdev
Ashcroft's Terrorism Policies Dismay Some Conservatives New York Times recdev
US Officials Claim of Russia Plutonium Theft has Authorities Scratching Their Heads Bellona (
Norway)
Security of radioactive material at low ebb Sacramento Bee fismat

July 23   
Bush Gets Counterterror Tour and Pushes His Security Plan New York Times recdev
Al-Qaeda Pirates Radioactive Cargo in Malacca: Report Peoples Daily DB

July 22   
Biden backs letting soldiers arrest civilians Washington Times recdev
Wider Military Role in U.S. Is Urged New York Times recdev
Russian nuclear theft alarms US Guardian (UK) rus, fismat

July 20   
Rostov's Security Services Take Heed of The Guardian's Report on Theft at Rostov Nuclear Power Plant Pravda (Ru) rus

July 19   
U.S. Defends Decision to Move Suspect in 'Dirty Bomb' Case New York Times DB
Russian nuclear theft alarms US Guardian (UK) rus
Russian, U.S. officials discuss nuclear safeguards AP rus

July 18   
Al - Qaida Weapon Access Worries U.S. New York Times recdev
Congress raps self, agencies for 9/11
Washington Times recdev

July 17   
In New Jersey, Nuclear Fears Have to Stand in Line New York Times reacs
Bush Sets Security Strategy
Los Angeles Times recdev
Beacon: Add to security at nuclear plant Poughkeepsie Journal reacs
Homeland Security Cost Weighed
Washington Post recdev

July 16   
President To Detail Security Strategy Washington Post recdev
Two Held in Alleged Plant Extortion New York Times reacs
The National Strategy For Homeland Security: Office of Homeland Security The White House recdev

July 15   
Watch nuclear transport plans FortWayne NT DB

July 14   
Protect nuclear waste from terrorists Tri-Valley Herald DB
The nuclear threat it could happen here Naples Daily News reacs
The nuclear threat Assessing the threat from Russia's arsenal Naples Daily News rus
Nuclear precaution: State distributes iodide pills
Asbury Park NT recdev

July 13   
Scientist panel warns of N-plant attack risk Patriot-News reac

July 11   
US's sweeping efforts to contain terrorFinancial Times (UK) recdev
Weapons of mass destruction Financial Times (UK) recdev
Gorbachev warns of Cold War legacy BBC (UK) rus

July 09   
EPA Found Unready for Terrorism Washington Post recdev
Iraq Accuses U.N. Arms Chief of Thwarting Talks New York Times
Iraq
Some states say no thanks to radiation pill USA Today recdev

July 08   
Nuclear waste risks mapped for Valley Morning Call DB

July 06   
Nuclear sites get armed police Times (UK) reacs

July 05   
Japanese Shipment of Nuclear Fuel Raises Security Fears New York Times Pu, NT fismat

July 04   
Nuclear rod goes missing from the DRC Mail&Guardian DB

July 03   
Sellafield waste tanks 'pose an undue risk' Guardian (UK) DB

July 02   
Experts see security weaknesses at TMI, others Patriot-New reacs
Dirty Bombs: Assessing the Threat [op ed] Washington Post DB
Georgia to Search for Post - Soviet Nuclear Material New York Times rus
Nuclear agency downplays risks over lost items
Toronto Star fismat

July 01   
Demonstrators Demand Closing of Indian Point New York Times NT reacs
'Loose nukes' worry U.S. Washington Times rus
Former Taliban chief describes ignorace of radioactive material Washington Times DB, Bomb
Nuke train raises fear of disaster Florida Times-Union DB
Coast Guard increases security; Seattle will get SWAT team Seattle Times recdev

June 30   

Military Stocking Up on Anti - Radiation Pills New York Times recdev
Nuclear leakage from ex-Soviet Union raises question: What gets through? AP rus
U.S., global agencies gear up to defend against insidious new threat AP recdev
PART II: Threat Reduction AP rus
`Even a high school kid' can do it, but how much is `enough'? AP bomb
Bits of doomsday changing hands raise alarms in post-September 11 world AP fismat

June 29   
In a Sign of the Times, the City Begins Deploying Radiation Detectors New York Times DB

June 28   
$10 Billion Pledged to Ex-Soviets to Dispose of Unconventional Arms New York Times rus
Group seeks safer nuke transport Rocky Mountain News DB
Tenet Calls for Security Safety Net Washington Post recdev

June 27   
Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared Washington Post recdev
Choosing routes, testing safety Christian Science Monitor DB
Moving nuclear waste Christian Science Monitor DB
A New Bid to Keep Nukes Safe Moscow Times rus
Dirty nukes: Nuclear proliferation is a neglected threat News-Journal DB
Nuclear plant upgrades after NRC inspection Post-Gazette reac
GAO Cites Rising Nuke Smuggling Risk Las Vegas SUN fismat
Bomb Material Missing From Tbilisi
New York Times fismat, rus

June 26   
Foul-Ups Mar Effort On Nuclear Materials Washington Post fismat
Groups release routes for nuclear waste Las Vegas Review-Journal DB
Agency Says 'Dirty Bomb' Could Be Made in Any Country New York Times DB
Nuclear Waste, Terror And Intrigue TomPaine.com  DB
NRC issues fine for missing fuel rods at nuclear plant Reuters DB
U.N. nuclear agency sees theft danger Washington Times fismat

June 25   
Report: U.S. Vulnerable to Attack Washington Post
Science-Technology Drive Is Urged to Fight Terror New York Times recdev
Better Nuclear, Power Defenses Needed -U.S. Report Reuters reacs
U.N.: Protect Radioactive Materials
New York Times fismat, DB


Are nuclear plants vulnerable? 

June 19
Industry official admits N-plants may be vulnerable Deseret News
US nuclear plants can survive plane attack China Daily
Experts Sum Up Their Fears of a Nuke Attack News Max
Concern on missed nuclear security checks Irish Independent

June 17
Terror check at Britain's nuclear sites The Scotsman

June 14
Experts wrangle over U.S. nuclear reactor security Reuters 

June 13
Fines for Nuclear Security Lapses New York Times 

June 8
Bush tells industry to fix terror risks Deseret News
Indian Point Nuclear Plant: Too Tempting For Terrorists NY Post


Could terrorists build a nuclear weapon?

June 9 
Mobile teams on hunt for atomic threats Boston Globe


Dirty bombs

June 23
'Dirty bomb' fodder vulnerable Tribune-Review 

June 21
Dirty" Bomb Could Explode In Russia Pravda (
Russia)

June 20
Dirty Bomb Threat Is Real [Op-Ed] Moscow Times

June 18
Schumer: Dirty Bomb Material Easy To Get New York Post

June 16
Nuclear Waste Poses Its Own 'Dirty' Threat Los Angeles Times
Dirty-bomb, car-bomb, boat-bomb, bomb plots... Time (UK)

June 13
Lawmakers Question CIA on Dirty-Bomb Suspect Washington Post
How Bad Would A Dirty Blast Be? Here's What The Experts Say
Washington Post

June 12
Al Muhajir Alleged to Be Scouting Terror Sites Washington Post
Imagining a 'Dirty Bomb' Washington Post
'Dirty Bomb' Plot Focuses Attention on Emergency Planning Washington Post
Suspect linked to al Qaeda Washington Times
Rep. Seeks Information on Materials New York Times
U.S. questions 2nd dirty-bomb suspect Charlotte Observer
What is a "dirty bomb?" CNN

June 11
'Dirty Bomb' Plot Uncovered, U.S. Says Washington Post
Panic Could Magnify Harm, Experts Say
Washington Post
Arrest Shifts Focus to U.S. Sources of Atomic Isotopes Washington Post
Dirty bombs biggest hazard: panic MSNBC
Dirty bombs' not rocket science
New Jersey
Dirty bombs 'credible threat,' experts warn National Post

June 10

U.S. Detains Alleged Dirty Bomb Terrorist Washington Post
U.S. Says It Thwarts Al Qaeda 'Dirty Bomb' Attack New York Times
U.S. Arrests American Accused of Planning 'Dirty Bomb' Attack New York Times

U.S. says terror suspect was plotting to explode 'dirty bomb' Atlanta Journal-Constitution


Fissile Materials

June 21
Uranium Theft May Be Part of Decade Old Heist Bellona (Norway)

June 19
How Secure Is a Nuclear Waste Truck? New York Times

June 18
Nuclear-waste conflict intensifies Opponents of plans point to terrorism USA Today

June 17
Schumer Proposes Tracking Radioactive Materials FaceStation

June 14
Border guards get radiation detectors The Star

June 12
A floating target for al-Qaeda? BBC (UK)

June 10
Area firm 'a terrorist target' Ottawa Citizen
Ottawa company called a `terror target' The Star


Russia

June 11
U.S. wants allies to fund more safeguards on former U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons Macon

June 07
Agency Deems Calif. Lab Insecure New York Times
Bush, as Terror Inquiry Swirls, Seeks Cabinet Post on Security New York Times
Radiation, Potassium Iodide and Indian Point [letters to editor] New York Times
Arms control expert warns of nuclear threat Greenwich Times

June 06
NRC Assessing U.S. Nuclear Plants' Airstrike Risk Reuters
NY Nuclear Plant Neighbors to Get Iodide Pills Reuters

June 05   
Residents Near NY Nuke Plant to Get Iodide Pills Reuters
FBI Questions U.S. Scuba Operators on Terror Threat Reuters

June 01   
Six arrested, one sought in radioactive 'dirty bomb' plot Guardian (UK)
Radiation Pills to Be Given Away
New York Times
Troops Guarding Nuclear Plants With Unloaded Weapons WGA Channel
The United States Is in a New Nuclear Arms Race With Terrorists
[op ed] Salt Lake Tribune
Missiles smuggled into U.S. Washington Times

May 31   
Former U.S. Defense Chief Sees New Terror Threat New York Times
Guard not loaded at nuclear plants
 York Daily Record

May 30   
Customs moving to block entry of nuclear weapons but offers no guarantees AP

May 29   
Backdoor Nuclear Threat To U.S. CBS News

May 28   
Nunn and Lugar Look to Safeguard Weapons Moscow Times
Employees at Indian Pt. Back Safety of Reactors New York Times

May 26   
FBI Warns About Small Planes Las Vegas SUN
Russian nuke dangers studied Washington Times
Tactical nuclear weapons pose major concern Los Angeles Times
Guards at Russian nuclear facilities ordered to fire warning shots at protesters AP

May 25   
Nuclear plant blueprints found on street National Post
Shipping nuke waste vulnerable to attack by terrorists, feds say Bloomberg News

May 24   
Connecting Deadly Dots New York Times

May 23   

Senators Push Nuclear Materials Safeguards Reuters
Supporters, critics of proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site spar over safety of transportation AP
Fears over weapons-grade uranium in 58 countries Financial Review

May 22   
Nation Left Jittery By Latest Series Of Terror Warnings Washington Post
Terrorist nukes are 'inevitable,' Rumsfeld says London Free Press (
Canada)

May 21   
Finding Rich Fodder in Nuclear Scientists New York Times
Trying to Add Light to the Heat on Indian Point New York Times
Hodges, citing terror warning, urges delay on bomb material shipments
Greenville News
U.S. Has $20Bln Plan for Nuclear Safeguards Moscow Times
Two studies warn of terrorist threat
Boston Globe
Rumsfeld: Terrorists Will Get Nukes AP
Poor security at reactors: report News.com.au
Rumsfeld: Terrorists Likely to Get Chemical, Nuclear or Biological Weapons
Washington Post

May 20   
Studies Urge Putin, Bush To Secure Nuclear Material Washington Post Pu, NT
A threat to nuclear plants Boston Globe

More Uranium Safeguards Urged
AP HEU, NT
A Risk of Loose Nukes Time.com
More Uranium Safeguards Urged
Las Vegas SUN HEU, NT
How safe now? CNN

May 19   
U.S. Pushing New Russia Nonproliferation Plan New York Times Pu, NT

May 17   
Post-9/11, Questions About Security at Electric Plants New York Times

May 16   
U.S. can't ignore nuclear threat USA Today

May 14   
Treaty's Dark Side: Threat of Terrorism L.A. Times
Security boosted at nuke facilities Washington Times
Nuclear Plant Threat Called Unreliable
Washington Post

May 13   
U.S. weighs July 4 threat Washington Times
Terrorists threaten to strike nuclear plants July 4 AP
Truck Drivers Needed for Terror War AP

May 12   
House Approves U.S., Russian Nuclear Exchange Visits Washington Post
U.S. Agencies Seen as Slow to Move on Terrorism Risk New York Times
Nuclear-waste risk small but lethal
Duluth Superior
Hansen Tries To Thwart N-Site Access Salt Lake Tribune
Lax Federal Lab Safeguards Found
New York Times